

APPENDIX B

FORCE STRUCTURE PLAN

This appendix is taken verbatim from *Department of Defense Base Closure and Realignment Report, March 1993*.

Background

Public Law 101-510 requires the Secretary of Defense to submit to the Congress and to the Commission a force structure plan for fiscal years 1994 through 1999. The Secretary submitted the plan to Congress and to the Commission on March 12, 1993.

The force structure plan which follows incorporates an assessment by the Secretary of the probable threats to the national security during the fiscal year 1994 through 1999 period, and takes into account the anticipated levels of funding for this period. The plan comprises three sections:

- The military threat assessment,
- The need for overseas basing, and
- The force structure, including the implementation plan.

The force structure plan is classified SECRET. What follows is the UNCLASSIFIED version of the plan.

Section I: Military Threat Assessment

The vital interests of the United States will be threatened by regional crises between historic antagonists, such as North and South Korea, India and Pakistan, and the Middle East/Persian Gulf states. Also, the collapse of political order as a result of ethnic enmities in areas such as Somalia and the former Yugoslavia will prompt international efforts to contain violence, halt the loss of life and the destruction of property, and re-establish civil society. The future world military situation will be characterized by regional actors with modern destructive weaponry, including chemical and biological weapons, modern ballistic missiles, and, in some cases, nuclear weapons. The acceleration of regional

strife caused by frustrated ethnic and nationalistic aspirations will increase the pressure on the United States to contribute military forces to international peacekeeping/enforcement and humanitarian relief efforts.

The United States faces three types of conflict in the coming years: deliberate attacks on U.S. allies or vital interests; the escalation of regional conflicts that eventually threaten U.S. allies or vital interests; and conflicts that do not directly threaten vital interests, but whose costs in lives of innocents demand an international response in which the United States will play a leading role.

Across the Atlantic

The Balkans and parts of the former Soviet Union will be a source of major crises in the coming years, as political-ethnic-religious antagonism weaken fragile post-Cold War institutions. These countries may resort to arms to protect narrow political-ethnic interests or maximize their power vis-a-vis their rivals. The presence of vast stores of conventional weapons and ammunition greatly increases the potential for these local conflicts to spread. Meanwhile, European NATO allies will continue to grapple with shaping an evolving regional security framework capable of crisis management and conflict prevention, as well as responding to out-of-area contingencies. These countries will develop closer relations with the central East European countries of Poland, the Czech and Slovak Republics, and Hungary, but they will be reluctant to admit the republics of the former Soviet Union into a formal collective defense arrangement. Attempts by these former Soviet republics to transform into democratic states with market economies and stable national boundaries may prove too difficult or too costly and could result in a reassertion of authoritarianism, economic collapse, and civil war. Unsettled civil-military relations, unstable relations between Russia and Ukraine, and retention of significant numbers of nuclear weapons even after the

implementation of START II, the continuation of other strategic programs, and relatively indiscriminate arms sales will remain troubling aspects of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

In the Middle East, competition for political influence and natural resources (i.e., water and oil), along with weak economies, Islamic fundamentalism, and demographic pressures will contribute to deteriorating living standards and encourage social unrest. The requirement for the United States to maintain a major role in Persian Gulf security arrangements will not diminish for the foreseeable future.

The major threat of military aggression or subversion in the Persian Gulf region may well emanate from Iran. Iran will find its principal leverage in subversion and propaganda, and in threats and military posturing below the threshold that would precipitate U.S. intervention.

Iraq will continue to be a major concern for the region and the world. By the turn of the century, Iraq could pose a renewed regional threat depending on what sanctions remain in place and what success Iraq has in circumventing them. Iraq continues to constitute a residual threat to some Gulf states, particularly Kuwait. Its military capabilities to threaten other Gulf Arab states will grow. These states will nevertheless continue to depend largely on the U.S. deterrent to forestall a renewed Iraqi drive for regional dominance.

A prolonged stalemate in the Middle East peace process may lead to further violence and threats to U.S. allies and interests, perhaps accelerating the popularity of anti-Western and Islamic radical movements.

Across the Pacific

The security environment in most of Asia risks becoming unstable as nations reorient their defense policies to adapt to the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet empire, the breakup of the former Soviet Union, and the lessons of the Persian Gulf War. Political and economic pressures upon Communist or authoritarian regimes may lead to greater instability and violence. Virtually every nation will base its strategic calculations on the premise

of a declining U.S. military presence. The lesser nations of Asia will become increasingly concerned about security in areas characterized by national rivalries.

Our most active regional security concern in Asia remains the military threat posed by North Korea to our treaty ally, the Republic of Korea. Our concerns are intensified by North Korea's efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems.

China's military modernization efforts of the last two decades will produce a smaller but more capable military with modern combat aircraft, including the Su-27/FLANKER. China will also have aerial refueling and airborne warning and control aircraft before the end of the decade. The Chinese Navy will have significantly improved air defense missile capabilities, antiship missiles, long-range cruise missiles (120 km range), and a new submarine-launched cruise missile. By the end of the decade China also will have improved its strategic nuclear forces.

Japan's major security concerns will focus primarily on the potential emergence of a reunified Korea armed with nuclear weapons, on the expanding Chinese naval threat, and on the possibility of a nationalistic Russia.

In South Asia, the principal threat to U.S. security will remain the potential of renewed conflict between India and Pakistan. While the conventional capabilities of both countries probably will be eroded by severe budget pressures, internal security obligations, and the loss of Superpower benefactors, India and Pakistan will still have nuclear-capable ballistic missiles.

The Rest of the World

This broad characterization covers regions not addressed above and is not intended to either diminish or denigrate the importance of U.S. interests, friends, and allies in areas beyond Europe and the Pacific.

In Latin America, democratic foundations remain unstable and the democratization process will remain vulnerable to a wide variety of influences and factors that could easily derail it. Virtually every country in the region will be victimized by drug-associated violence and crime.

Over the next few years, the capabilities of almost all of the militaries in the region will remain static or decline despite planned or ongoing measures to upgrade or modernize existing inventories or restructure. A single exception may be Chile, which may see some force structure improvements through the mid-1990s.

In Africa, chronic instability, insurgency, and civil war will continue throughout the continent. Two major kinds of security issues will dominate U.S. relations with the region: non-combatant evacuation and conflict resolution. Operations most likely to draw the U.S. military into the continent include disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, international peace-keeping, and logistic support for allied military operations. Further, conflict resolution efforts will test the growing reputation of the United States for negotiation and mediation.

Direct threats to U.S. allies or vital interests that would require a significant military response in the near future are those posed by North Korea, Iran, and Iraq. More numerous, however, are those regional conflicts that would quickly escalate to threaten vital U.S. interests in Southeastern Europe, Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. These conflicts would not require military responses on the order of DESERT STORM, but they would pose unique demands on the ability of U.S. Armed Forces to maintain stability and provide the environment for political solutions. Finally, there will be a large number of contingencies in which the sheer magnitude of human suffering and moral outrage demands a U.S. response, probably in concert with the United Nations. The current number of international crises is unlikely to diminish before the end of this decade, as many regions of the world continue to suffer the ravages of failed economic programs and nationalistic violence.

Section II: Justification for Overseas Basing

As we reduce forward-presence forces globally, we nevertheless will continue to emphasize the fundamental roles of forward-presence forces essential to deterring aggression, fostering alliance relationships, bolstering regional

stability, and protecting U.S. interests abroad. Forward-presence activities such as forward basing, rotational and periodic deployments, exercises and port visits, military-to-military contacts, security assistance, combatting terrorism, combatting narcotrafficking, and protecting American citizens in crisis areas will remain central to our stability and U.S. influence will be promoted through emerging forward-presence operations. These include roles for the military in the war on drugs and in providing humanitarian assistance.

Over the past 45 years, the day-to-day presence of U.S. forces in regions vital to U.S. national interest has been key to averting crises and preventing war. Our forces throughout the world show our commitment, lend credibility to our alliances, enhance regional stability, and provide crisis-response capability while promoting U.S. influence and access. Although the numbers of U.S. forces stationed overseas will be reduced, the credibility of our capability and intent to respond to crisis will continue to depend on judicious forward presence. Forward presence is also vital to the maintenance of the system of collective defense by which the United States works with its friends and allies to protect our security interests, while reducing the burdens of defense spending and unnecessary arms competition.

Atlantic Forces

U.S. interests in the Atlantic Regions, including Europe, the Mediterranean, the Middle East, Africa and Southwest Asia, require continuing commitment. There will be forces, forward stationed and rotational, with the capability for rapid reinforcement from within the Atlantic region and from the United States and the means to support deployment of larger forces when needed.

The end of the Cold War has significantly reduced the requirement to station U.S. forces in Europe. Yet, the security of the United States remains linked to that of Europe, and our continued support of the Atlantic Alliance is crucial. Our stake in long-term European security and stability, as well as enduring economic, cultural, and geopolitical interests require a continued commitment of U.S. military strength.

Our forward presence forces in Europe must be sized, designed, and postured to preserve an active and influential role in the Atlantic Alliance and in the future security framework on the continent. The remaining force of 1 Army Corps with 2 divisions and 3(+) Air Force Fighter Wing Equivalents (FWE) is a direct response to the uncertainty and instability that remains in this region. In addition, maritime forces committed to Europe will be one Carrier Battle Group (CVBG) and one Amphibious Ready Group (ARG/MEU(SOC)). These forward-deployed forces provide an explicit commitment to the security and stability of Europe, and pre-positioned equipment provides an infrastructure for CONUS-based forces should the need arise in Europe or elsewhere.

The U.S. response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was built on the foundation of previous U.S. presence in the region. Air, ground, and maritime deployments, coupled with pre-position, combined exercises, security assistance, and infrastructure, as well as European and regional enroute strategic airlift infrastructure, enhanced the crisis-response force buildup. Future presence in Southwest Asia will be defined by ongoing bilateral negotiations with the governments of the Gulf Cooperative Council. Our commitment will be reinforced by pre-positioned equipment, access agreements, bilateral planning, periodic deployments and exercises, visits by senior officials and security assistance.

Pacific Forces

U.S. interests in the Pacific, including Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean, require a continuing commitment. Because the forces of potential adversaries in the Pacific are different than the Atlantic, and due to the maritime character of the area, U.S. military forces in this vast region of major importance differ from those in the Atlantic arena. As Asia continues its economic and political development, U.S. forward presence will continue to serve as a stabilizing influence and a restraint to potential regional aggression and rearmament.

Forward presence forces will be principally maritime, with half of the projected carrier and amphibious force oriented toward this area

including one CVBG, ARG, and Marine Expeditionary Force forward-based in this region. The improving military capability of South Korea has enabled our Army forces to be trimmed to less than a division. One Air Force FWE in South Korea and 1(+) FWE in Japan are to be forward-based in this region. In addition, presence in both Alaska and Hawaii will be maintained.

Elsewhere in the World

In the less-predictable yet increasingly important other regions of the globe, the United States seeks to preserve its access to foreign markets and resources, mediate the traumas of economic and social strife, deter regional aggressors, and promote the regional stability necessary for progress and prosperity. From Latin America to sub-Saharan Africa to the far-flung islands of the world's oceans, American military men and women contribute daily to the unsung tasks of nation-building, security assistance, and quiet diplomacy that protect and extend our political goodwill and access to foreign markets. Such access becomes increasingly critical in an era of reduced forward presence, when forces deploying from the United States are more than ever dependent on enroute and host-nation support to ensure timely response to distant crises. In the future, maintaining forward presence through combined planning and exercises, pre-positioning and service agreements, and combined warfighting doctrine and interoperability could spell the difference between success or failure in defending vital regional interests.

Contingency Forces

The U.S. strategy for the come-as-you-are arena of spontaneous, often unpredictable crises requires fully trained, highly ready forces that are rapidly deliverable and initially self-sufficient. Therefore, such forces must be drawn primarily from the active force structure and tailored into highly effective joint task forces that capitalize on the unique capabilities of each Service and the special operations forces. In this regard, the CINC must have the opportunity to select from a broad spectrum of capabilities such as: airborne, air assault, light infantry, and

rapidly deliverable heavy forces from the Army; the entire range of fighter, fighter-bomber, and long range conventional bomber forces provided by the Air Force; carrier-based naval air power, the striking capability of surface combatants, and the covert capabilities of attack submarines from the Navy; the amphibious combat power of the Marine Corps, particularly when access ashore is contested, which includes on-station MEU(SOC) and Maritime Pre-positioning Ships; and the unique capabilities of the special operations forces. Additionally, certain reserve units must be maintained at high readiness to assist and augment responding active units. Reserve forces perform much of the lift and other vital missions from the outset of any contingency operation. In regions where no U.S. forward presence exists, these contingency forces are the tip of the spear, first into action, and followed as required by heavier forces and long-term sustainment.

Section III: The Force Structure and Implementation Plan

	FY 92	FY 95	FY 97
ARMY DIVISIONS			
Active	14	12	12
Reserve(Cadre)	10(0)	6(2)	6(2)
MARINE CORPS DIVISIONS			
Active	3	3	3
Reserve	1	1	1
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS	13	12	12
TRAINING CARRIER	1	1	1
CARRIER AIR WINGS			
Active	12	11	11
Reserve	2	2	2
BATTLE FORCE SHIPS	466	427	425
AIR FORCE FIGHTERS			
Active	1,248	1,098	1,098
Reserve	816	810	810
AIR FORCE BOMBERS	242	176	184

DoD Personnel
(End Strength in thousands)

	FY 92	FY 95	FY 97
ACTIVE DUTY			
Army	610	538	522
Navy	542	490	489
Marine Corps	185	170	159
Air Force	470	409	400
TOTAL	1,807	1,607	1,570
RESERVES	1,114	911	907
CIVILIANS	1,006	904	884