

of U.S. Army Armament, Munitions and Chemical Command (AMCCOM) to Redstone Arsenal, AL, as recommended by the 1991 Base Closure Commission, reorganize these functions under Tank Automotive Command (TACOM) with the functions remaining in place at Rock Island Arsenal, IL.

## DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

### Shipyards

#### Charleston Naval Shipyard, South Carolina

*Category: Naval Shipyard*

*Mission: Repair, Maintenance,  
and Overhaul of Navy Ships*

*One-time Cost: \$ 125.5 million*

*Savings: 1994-99: \$ 348.4 million*

*Annual: \$ 90.9 million*

*Payback: 3 years*

#### SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close the Naval Shipyard (NSY) Charleston.

#### SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

NSY Charleston's capacity is excess to that required to support the number of ships in the DoD Force Structure Plan. An analysis of naval shipyard capacity was performed with a goal of reducing excess capacity to the maximum extent possible while maintaining the overall military value of the remaining shipyards. The closure of NSY Charleston, when combined with the recommended closure of NSY Mare Island, California, results in the maximum reduction of excess capacity, and its workload can readily be absorbed by the remaining yards. The elimination of another shipyard performing nuclear work would reduce this capability below the minimum capacity required to support this critical area. The closure of NSY Charleston, in combination with Mare Island NSY, allows the elimination of a greater amount of excess capacity while maintaining the overall value of the remaining shipyards at a higher military value level than that of the current configuration of shipyards. Other options either reduced capacity below that required to support the approved force levels, eliminated specific

capabilities needed to support mission requirements or resulted in a lower military value for this group of activities.

#### COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community's concerns centered on Charleston Naval Shipyard's military value ranking by the Navy. It pointed out that Charleston ranked higher in military value than did NSY Portsmouth and NSY Pearl Harbor. Moreover, the community argued that the Navy underestimated NSY Charleston's military value because it failed to consider Charleston's ability to dry-dock four SSN-688 class submarines and its ability to perform off-site, short-duration work on nuclear ships. The community also criticized the Navy's capacity analysis. It believed the Navy's analysis did not accurately reflect Charleston's nuclear capacity.

Furthermore, the Charleston community maintained the Navy did not consistently seek to maximize military value and minimize excess capacity. For example, the community argued that closing Mare Island and Norfolk Naval Shipyards would leave military value unchanged, but would leave less excess capacity than would be left by the closures of Mare Island and Charleston Naval Shipyards. In another scenario, the community stated that closing Mare Island and Portsmouth Naval Shipyards would yield a higher military value than that produced by the closures of Mare Island and Charleston Naval Shipyards.

#### COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission, in view of the considerable excess of shipyard capacity, found that reducing excess capacity was a primary consideration. In light of the subjective nature of the military value determination, the Commission chose to view the military value presented by the Navy as a gross, rather than a precise, discriminator. As such, the Commission sought to eliminate as much excess capacity as possible.

The measurement of shipyard capacity is not an exact science, nor is it an easy task. The Commission reviewed a number of past shipyard capacity studies and determined that the capacity study submitted by the Navy for base closure was an acceptable indicator of shipyard capacity.

## COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from criterion 1. Therefore, the Commission rejects the Secretary of Defense's recommendation on Charleston and recommends the following: close Naval Shipyard Charleston, but maintain the option for the 1993 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission later to recommend retention of Charleston Naval Shipyard facilities deemed necessary to establish or support Naval commands that are retained, realigned to, or relocated to Charleston, South Carolina. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

### **Mare Island Naval Shipyard, California**

*Category: Naval Shipyard*

*Mission: Repair, Maintenance, and Overhaul of Navy Ships*

*One-time Cost: \$ 397.8 million*

*Savings: 1994-99: \$ 544.3 million*

*Annual: \$ 206.7 million*

*Payback: 4 years*

## SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close the Mare Island Naval Shipyard (NSY). Relocate the Combat Systems Technical Schools Command activity to Dam Neck, Virginia. Relocate one submarine to the Naval Submarine Base, Bangor, Washington. Family housing located at Mare Island NSY will be retained as necessary to support Naval Weapons Station Concord.

## SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

The capacity of the Mare Island NSY is excess to that required to support the reduced number of ships reflected in the DoD Force Structure Plan. An analysis of naval shipyard capacity was performed with a goal of reducing excess capacity to the maximum extent possible while maintaining the overall military value of the remaining shipyards. Mare Island has the lowest military value of those shipyards supporting the Pacific Fleet, and its workload can be readily absorbed by the remaining yards which possess higher military value. The closure of Mare Island NSY, in combination with the Charleston NSY, allows the elimination

of a greater amount of excess capacity while maintaining the overall value of the remaining shipyards at a higher military value level than that of the current configuration of shipyards. Other options either reduced capacity below that required to support the approved force levels, eliminated specific capabilities needed to support mission requirements or resulted in a lower military value for this group of activities.

## COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community claimed the Navy's military value calculation did not consider Mare Island's unique capabilities. For example, the community stated Mare Island had the Navy's only submarine construction capability and the only attack submarine refueling capability on the West Coast. The community felt the Navy's data call on capacity was confusing; it believed the data call may have overstated Mare Island's capacity relative to those of other shipyards. The community also said the Navy credited the Long Beach Naval Shipyard with a nuclear ship repair capability that it does not have. Consequently, the community argued Mare Island should have been ranked third, not seventh, in the Navy's shipyard category.

The community also argued the cost and impact of moving Mare Island's ocean engineering capability was not adequately addressed by the Navy. It stated that Mare Island has unique nuclear cleanup costs that will only be required if the base is closed.

## COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission, in view of the considerable excess of shipyard capacity, found that reducing excess capacity was a primary consideration. In light of the subjective nature of the military value determination, the Commission chose to view the military value presented by the Navy as a gross, rather than a precise, discriminator. As such, the Commission sought to eliminate as much excess capacity as possible.

The measurement of shipyard capacity is not an exact science, nor is it an easy task. The Commission reviewed a number of past shipyard capacity studies and determined that the capacity study submitted by the Navy for base closure was an acceptable indicator of shipyard capacity.

When relocating a function from a closing shipyard, the Navy should determine the availability of the required capability from another DoD entity or the private sector prior to the expenditure of resources to recreate the capability at another shipyard.

The Department of Defense and the United States government bear the obligation for all environmental restoration costs, regardless of whether a military installation is closed and therefore, should not be considered as part of the costs to close a base.

#### **COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS**

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria, and therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Mare Island Naval Shipyard (NSY). Relocate the Combat Systems Technical Schools Command activity to Dam Neck, Virginia. Relocate one submarine to the Naval Submarine Base, Bangor, Washington. Family housing located at Mare Island NSY will be retained as necessary to support Naval Weapons Station Concord.

#### ***Operational Air Stations***

##### **Marine Corps Air Station El Toro, California**

*Category: Operational Air Station*

*Mission: Support Aviation Operations*

*One-time Cost: \$ 897.6 million*

*Savings: 1994-99: \$ 349.9 million*

*Annual: \$ 148.5 million*

*Payback: 4 years*

#### **SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION**

Close Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) El Toro, California. Relocate its aircraft along with their dedicated personnel, equipment and support to Naval Air Station (NAS) Miramar, California and MCAS Camp Pendleton, California.

#### **SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION**

Naval and Marine air wings are projected to be reduced consistent with fleet requirements in the DoD Force Structure Plan, creating an excess in air station capacity. MCAS El Toro is recommended for closure since, of the jet bases

supporting the Pacific Fleet, it has the lowest military value, has no expansion possibilities, is the subject of serious encroachment and land use problems, and has many of its training evolutions conducted over private property. The redistribution of aviation assets allows the relocation of Marine Corps fixed wing and helicopter assets to the NAS Miramar, in a manner which both eliminates excess capacity and avoids the construction of a new aviation facility at Marine Corps Air-Ground Combat Center, 29 Palms, California. In an associated action the squadrons and related activities at NAS Miramar will move to NAS Lemoore in order to make room for the relocation of the MCAS El Toro squadrons. This closure results in a new configuration of Naval and Marine Corps air stations having an increased average military value when compared to the current mix of air stations in the Pacific Fleet. Finally the Department of the Navy will dispose of the land and facilities at MCAS El Toro and any proceeds will be used to defray base closure expenses.

#### **COMMUNITY CONCERNS**

The community expressed concern the closure of MCAS El Toro would have a significantly adverse economic impact on an area already affected by other defense cutbacks. It also argued that the Navy's military value ranking of MCAS El Toro was too low and that the ranking did not reflect the quality performance of the units from El Toro. The community suggested alternatives to the closure of El Toro; it stated that NAS Miramar would be a more appropriate candidate for closure because NAS Miramar had older facilities and less housing than did MCAS El Toro. The community argued that the Navy greatly overstated Miramar's expansion capability citing that Miramar had environmental constraints on any further development.

The Twentynine Palms community also suggested that the Commission reconsider its 1991 recommendation to close MCAS Tustin and its 1993 recommendation to redirect rotary wing aircraft from Marine Corps Air-Ground Combat Center Twentynine Palms to NAS Miramar. The community maintained that those recommendations would cause overwhelming operational problems because they would place both rotary and fixed wing aircraft at NAS Miramar.

The Tustin community did not want the Commission to reconsider its 1991 recommendation to close MCAS Tustin; it wanted the 1991 Commission's closure decision to remain intact. The Tustin community had already invested substantially in a base reuse program. It did not want to abandon its two-year investment of effort and money in the reuse plan. The Tustin community also believed better alternatives existed to relocate Marine Corps helicopters without retaining MCAS Tustin. Specifically, it proposed: keeping MCAS El Toro open and adding the MCAS Kaneohe Bay fixed wing mission there; closing NAS Miramar and relocating its units per the Secretary of Defense's recommendations. It asserted this proposal would enhance operational readiness and still allow the community to pursue its reuse plan. The Tustin community also contended the Commission's decision to reconsider its 1991 recommendation would encourage other communities to ignore the finality of the Commission's actions and would encourage communities to resist closures long after the final vote of the Commission.

#### **COMMISSION FINDINGS**

The Commission found air and ground encroachment at MCAS El Toro precluded future mission growth or force structure changes, and current mission requirements cause operations to be conducted over private property. It also found that force-structure reductions have created excess capacity at the Navy and Marine Corps west coast air stations. Relocation of fixed and rotary wing aircraft to NAS Miramar places these assets at a base that is relatively free of future encroachment, eliminates excess capacity, and integrated operations can be safely accomplished through careful base and flight operations planning. The Commission found relocation to NAS Miramar to be operationally advantageous due to close proximity to the Marine division at Camp Pendleton, where a significant percentage of critical training is conducted.

The Commission also found a sufficient number of acres were available at NAS Miramar to accommodate the aircraft, personnel, and support equipment from MCAS Tustin in spite of environmental constraints on development.

While areas expected to be affected by necessary expansion included critical habitats, none were located in quantities sufficient to preclude anticipated necessary expansion. It further found that acreage expected to be developed for the placement of KC-130s was constrained such that either adjustment to development plans or relocation to MCAS Yuma, Arizona, was required.

The Secretary of Defense suggested a revision to his original March 1993 recommendation. The Commission found the revised proposal had a higher military value and resulted in increased savings and should be adopted.

#### **COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION**

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from criteria 1, 2, and 3. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) El Toro, California. Relocate its aircraft along with their dedicated personnel, equipment and support to other naval air stations, primarily, Naval Air Station (NAS) Miramar, California, and MCAS Camp Pendleton, California. In associated action, the squadrons and related activities at NAS Miramar will move to other naval air stations, primarily NAS Lemoore and NAS Fallon in order to make room for the relocation of the MCAS El Toro squadrons. Relocate Marine Corps Reserve Center to NAS Miramar. Additionally, change the recommendation of the 1991 Commission, which was to close MCAS Tustin and relocate its helicopter assets to Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center at Twentynine Palms, California, as follows: relocate MCAS Tustin helicopter assets to NAS North Island, NAS Miramar, or MCAS Camp Pendleton, California. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

#### **Naval Air Station Barbers Point, Hawaii**

*Category: Operational Air Station*

*Mission: Support Naval Aviation Operations*

*One-time Cost: \$ 897.6 million*

*Savings: 1994-99: \$ 349.9 million*

*Annual: \$ 148.5 million*

*Payback: 4 years*

### SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close the Naval Air Station (NAS) Barbers Point and relocate its aircraft along with their dedicated personnel, equipment and support to Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS), Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii and NAS Whidbey Island, Washington. Retain the family housing as needed for multi-service use.

### SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

The NAS Barbers Point is recommended for closure because its capacity is excess to that required to support the reduced force levels contained in the DoD Force Structure Plan. The analysis of required capacity supports only one naval air station in Hawaii. NAS Barbers Point has a lower military value than MCAS Kaneohe Bay and its assets can be readily redistributed to other existing air stations. By maintaining operations at the MCAS, Kaneohe Bay, we retained the additional capacity that air station provides in supporting ground forces. With the uncertainties posed in overseas basing MCAS Kaneohe Bay provides the flexibility to support future military operations for both Navy and Marine Corps and is of greater military value. In an associated move the F-18 and CH-46 squadrons at MCAS Kaneohe Bay will move to NAS Miramar to facilitate the relocation of the NAS Barbers Point squadrons. Finally the Department of the Navy will dispose of the land and facilities at NAS Barbers Point and any proceeds will be used to defray base closure expenses.

### COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The State of Hawaii supports the closure of NAS Barbers Point because it is interested in reusing the land currently occupied by the Navy.

### COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found retention of the Naval Air Reserve Center, in view of force structure reductions, was not consistent with operational requirements. It also found these reductions indicate the need for only one major Naval Air Station in Hawaii, and that MCAS Kaneohe Bay, with significantly higher military value and no ground-encroachment problems, was clearly the base warranting retention. The Commission found

that relocation of many of the Marine Corps air assets at Kaneohe Bay which were planned for relocation to other air stations, was required to make room for the aviation assets from NAS Barbers Point.

The Secretary of Defense suggested a revision to his original March 1993 recommendation. The Commission found the revised proposal had a higher military value and should be adopted.

### COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from the force-structure plan and criteria 1 and 2. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: Close Naval Air Station (NAS) Barbers Point and relocate its aircraft along with their dedicated personnel and equipment support to other naval air stations, including Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS), Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii, and NAS Whidbey Island, Washington. Disestablish the Naval Air Reserve Center. Retain the family housing as needed for multi-service use. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

### Naval Air Station Cecil Field, Florida

*Category: Operational Air Station*

*Mission: Support Naval Aviation Operations*

*One-time Cost: \$ 312.1 million*

*Savings: 1994-99: \$ -189.1 million (Cost)*

*Annual: \$ 48.9 million*

*Payback: 13 years*

### SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close Naval Air Station, Cecil Field and relocate its aircraft along with dedicated personnel, equipment and support to Marine Corps Air Station, Cherry Point, North Carolina; Naval Air Station, Oceana, Virginia, and Marine Corps Air Station, Beaufort, South Carolina. Disposition of major tenants is as follows: Marine Corps Security Force Company relocates to MCAS Cherry Point; Aviation Intermediate Maintenance Department relocates to MCAS Cherry Point; Air Maintenance Training Group Detachment, Fleet Aviation Support Office Training Group Atlantic, and Sea Operations Detachment relocate to MCAS Cherry Point and NAS Oceana.

## SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

Carrier air wings will be reduced consistent with fleet requirements in the DoD Force Structure Plan, creating an excess in air station capacity. Reducing this excess capacity is complicated by the requirement to "bed down" different mixes of aircraft at various air stations. In making these choices, the outlook for environmental and land use issues was significantly important. In making the determination for reductions at air stations supporting the Atlantic Fleet, NAS Cecil Field was selected for closure because it represented the greatest amount of excess capacity which could be eliminated with assets most readily redistributed to receiving air stations. The preponderance of aircraft to be redistributed from NAS Cecil Field were F/A-18s which were relocated to two MCAS on the East Coast, Beaufort and Cherry Point. These air stations both had a higher military value than NAS Cecil Field, alleviated concerns with regard to future environmental and land use problems and dovetail with the recent determination for joint military operations of Navy and Marine Corps aircraft from carrier decks. Some NAS Cecil Field assets are relocating to NAS Oceana, an air station with a lower military value, because NAS Oceana is the only F-14 air station supporting the Atlantic Fleet and had to be retained to support military operations of these aircraft. Its excess capacity was merely utilized to absorb the remaining aircraft from NAS Cecil Field.

## COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community claimed the Navy's recommendation was flawed because it understated the military value of NAS Cecil Field and overstated the savings associated with closing NAS Cecil Field. The community argued closing NAS Cecil Field and relocating its aircraft to MCAS Beaufort, MCAS Cherry Point and NAS Oceana would be more expensive than leaving NAS Cecil Field open. The community focused on Cecil Field's greater expansion capability. It stated Cecil Field, unlike Cherry Point, Beaufort, and Oceana, did not have encroachment problems; furthermore, the community of Jacksonville adopted a Land-Use Comprehensive Plan which strictly limited the amount of development around Cecil Field. The community also argued MCAS

Beaufort and MCAS Cherry Point had significant wetlands contained within their installations which limited the expansion of runways. It emphasized construction on wetlands would require the Navy to create new wetlands to offset the loss of sensitive environmental land and the ratio of wetlands use was lower at NAS Cecil Field than at either Beaufort or Cherry Point.

The community also claimed operating costs would be lower at NAS Cecil Field than at the other air stations because Cecil Field was the closest to its training areas. The community stated the Navy should have considered these factors when assigning its military value ranking to Cecil Field and had the Navy done so, it would have seen that Cecil Field ranked far above Oceana, Beaufort and Cherry Point.

## COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found significant excess capacity existed at NAS Cecil Field. The Commission also found current and potential future air encroachment at NAS Cecil Field were overstated by the Navy. The Commission also found other east coast air stations had higher priority missions, and NAS Cecil Field was not close enough to the Marine Corps Division at Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune, NC to support Marine Corps air assets.

## COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: Close Naval Air Station, Cecil Field and relocate its aircraft along with dedicated personnel, equipment and support to Marine Corps Air Station, Cherry Point, North Carolina; Naval Air Station, Oceana, Virginia, and Marine Corps Air Station, Beaufort, South Carolina. Disposition of major tenants is as follows: Marine Corps Security Force Company relocates to MCAS Cherry Point; Aviation Intermediate Maintenance Department relocates to MCAS Cherry Point; Air Maintenance Training Group Detachment, Fleet Aviation Support Office Training Group Atlantic, and Sea Operations Detachment relocate to MCAS Cherry Point and NAS Oceana.

## Naval Air Station Agana, Guam

*Category: Operational Air Station*  
*Mission: Support Naval Aviation Operations*  
*One-time Cost: \$ 123.5 million*  
*Savings: 1994-99: \$ 51.4 million*  
*Annual: \$ 21.3 million*  
*Payback: 11 years*

### SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

None. The Commission added this military installation to the list of installations recommended for closure or realignment.

### COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community urged the Commission to recommend the closure of NAS Agana. The community stated that it wanted to reuse the facilities at NAS Agana to expand its civilian airport. The community asserted NAS Agana is very low in military value; it argued the few activities performed at NAS Agana could be moved into existing facilities at Andersen Air Force Base, and the cost of relocation would be far less than the \$229 million estimated by GAO. The community contended the payback period for the closure of NAS Agana would be between three and ten years.

### COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found excess land and operations, maintenance, and administrative capacity existed at Andersen AFB to allow consolidation of the mission, personnel, aircraft, and support equipment of NAS Agana at Andersen AFB. The Commission found the consolidation was economically feasible and due to the elimination of duplicate base operating and administrative costs, the closure would be paid back in 11 years. Housing at NAS Agana supports Navy commands throughout Guam. The Commission also found if this housing were retained at NAS Agana, it would not be necessary to build replacement bachelor or family housing in the area of or on Andersen AFB because the two bases are only 15 miles apart.

### COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from the force structure plan and final criteria 2 and 3. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Naval Air Station (NAS) Agana. Move aircraft, personnel, and associated equipment to Andersen AFB, Guam. Retain housing at NAS Agana necessary to support Navy personnel who have relocated to Andersen AFB. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force structure plan and final criteria.

## Naval Air Facility, Midway Island

*Category: Operational Air Station*  
*Mission: Support Naval Aviation Operations*  
*One-time Cost: \$ 2.1 million*  
*Savings: 1994-99: \$ 32.9 million*  
*Annual: \$ 6.6 million*  
*Payback: 2 years*

### SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close Naval Air Facility Midway Island.

### SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

The 1991 Commission Report, pages 5-19, recommended the elimination of the mission at NAF Midway Island and its continued operation under a caretaker status. Based on the DoD Force Structure Plan, its capacity is excess to that needed to support forces in its geographic area. There is no operational need for this air facility to remain in the inventory even in a caretaker status. Therefore, the Navy recommends that NAF Midway be closed and appropriate disposal action taken.

### COMMUNITY CONCERNS

There were no formal expressions from the community.

### COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found no operational reason to maintain this facility, even in a caretaker status.

### COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: Close Naval Air Facility Midway Island.

#### *Training Air Stations*

#### **Naval Air Station Memphis, Tennessee**

*Category: Training Air Station*

*Mission: Aviation Maintenance and*

*Operations Training*

*Cost to Realign: \$ 249 million*

*Savings: 1994-99: \$ -75.9 million (Cost)*

*Annual: \$ 49.7 million*

*Payback: 10 years*

#### **SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION**

Realign Naval Air Station (NAS) Memphis by terminating the flying mission and relocating its reserve squadrons to Carswell AFB, Texas. Relocate the Naval Air Technical Training Center to NAS Pensacola, Florida. The Bureau of Naval Personnel, currently in Washington, D.C., will be relocated to NAS Memphis as part of a separate recommendation.

#### **SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION**

Naval aviator requirements are decreasing as a result of carrier air wing and fleet reductions consistent with the DoD Force Structure Plan. The NAS Memphis capacity is excess to that required to train the number of student aviators required to meet fleet needs. The Navy analyzed its training air stations with a goal of reducing excess capacity to the maximum extent consistent with the decreasing throughput of students. Any remaining mix of air stations needed, at a minimum, to maintain the overall military value of the remaining bases, while allowing continuance of key mission requirements and maximized efficiency. These factors included availability of training airspace, outlying fields and access to over-water training. The inland location of NAS Memphis and lack of training airspace make it a primary candidate for closure. Its realignment combined with the recommended closure of NAS Meridian, Mississippi, reduces excess capacity while allowing consolidation of naval air

training around the two air stations with the highest military value. The resulting configuration increases the average military value of the remaining training air stations and maximizes efficiency through restructuring around the two hubs, thus increasing the effectiveness of aviation training. Relocation of the Naval Air Technical Training Center fills excess capacity created by the closure of the Naval Aviation Depot and the Naval Supply Center at NAS Pensacola.

#### **COMMUNITY CONCERNS**

The community stressed NAS Memphis was improperly evaluated as a training air station. The NAS Memphis primary mission is enlisted aviation technical training; pilot training has not been conducted for over three decades. Moreover, NAS Memphis was evaluated using military-value criteria which do not address the installation's main training function. The community also stated the amount of military construction required to relocate the Naval Air Technical Training Command to Pensacola would be double the Navy estimate. The community also offered nine alternatives that would save money by moving additional functions to NAS Memphis in lieu of the recommended movement out of NAS Memphis.

#### **COMMISSION FINDINGS**

The Commission found the Secretary's realignment recommendation was consistent with the force-structure plan. The Commission found that, although the decision to realign NAS Memphis was initially premised on Memphis as a training air station, other factors justified the decision. These factors included the reduction of excess training capacity by relocating Naval Air Technical Training Command, Memphis, to NAS Pensacola, the achievement of economies of personnel and support through the consolidation of enlisted and officer aviation training at NAS Pensacola, and the consolidation of reserve air assets at Carswell Air Force Base. In addition, the Commission found significant cost savings could be achieved within a reasonable payback period even if military construction costs proved to be greater than the Navy's original estimate.

The Commission further found that consolidation of the Reserve air assets and Reserve Aviation Squadrons would realize economies

in management and training. By relocating these units to Carswell, they would be closer to operational areas and could capitalize on these in integrating training with operational units. In addition, the Commission found that the central location of Carswell would enhance Reserve contributory support to Navy Airlift.

The Secretary of Defense suggested a revision to March 1993 recommendation. The Commission found the revised proposal had higher military value and should be adopted.

#### COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criteria 1 and 3. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: realign Naval Air Station, Memphis, by terminating the flying mission and relocating its reserve squadrons to Carswell, Texas. Disestablish the Naval Air Reserve Center, and relocate the Marine Corps (Wing) Reserve Center, Millington, to Carswell. Relocate the Naval Air Technical Training Center to NAS Pensacola, Florida. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

#### Naval Air Station Meridian, Mississippi

*Category: Training Air Station*

*Mission: Jet Pilot Training*

*One-time Cost: N/A*

*Savings: 1994-99: N/A*

*Annual: N/A*

*Payback: N/A*

#### SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close Naval Air Station (NAS) Meridian. Relocate advanced strike training to Naval Air Station Kingsville, Texas. Relocate intermediate strike training and Naval Technical Training Center to NAS Pensacola, Florida.

#### SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

Projected reductions contained in the Department of Defense Force Structure Plan require a substantial decrease in training air station capacity. When considering air space and

facilities of all types of support aviation training, there is about twice the capacity required to perform the mission. The training conducted at the Naval Air Station, Meridian can be consolidated with similar training at the Naval Air Station, Kingsville and the Naval Air Station, Pensacola. This results in an economy and efficiency of operations which enhances the military value of the training and places training aircraft in proximity to over-water air space and potential berthing sites for carriers being used in training evolutions. Currently, for example, pilots training in Meridian fly to the Naval Air Station, Pensacola in order to do carrier landing training. The closure of Meridian and the accompanying closure of the Naval Air Station, Memphis, result in centralized aviation training functions at bases with a higher average military value than that possessed by the training air stations before closure. Both the Naval Air Station, Kingsville and the Naval Air Station, Pensacola have higher military value than the Naval Air Station, Meridian. The consolidation of the Naval Technical Training Center with its parent command, the Chief of Naval Education and Training, will provide for improvement in the management and efficiency of the training establishment and enhance its military value to the Navy.

#### COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community claimed the Navy's military value ranking of NAS Meridian was too low. It argued Naval training requires primarily "over-ground" airspace, but the Navy's military value matrix was heavily weighted for "over-water" airspace. Since Meridian has considerable "over-ground" airspace but no "over-water" airspace, its military value ranking was unfairly diminished. The community also argued the Navy's training plan failed to provide enough capacity to accomplish needed strike training and NAS Meridian was essential to meet the requirement. The community believed the Navy's inclusion of bases into "complexes" was improper because it resulted in a failure to consider alternative scenarios for reducing excess capacity. The community believed greater cost savings would be achieved by closing other air stations with greater excess capacity and lower military value.

### COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found excess capacity existed in Naval Pilot Training, but it did not exist in Naval Strike Pilot Training. The Commission found a second full-strike training base was required to accommodate the current and future pilot training rate (PTR). The Commission further found military construction for the T-45, the Navy's new intermediate and advanced strike training aircraft, which is complete at NAS Kingsville and has begun at NAS Meridian, is required at two sites to support future pilot training.

### COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from criteria 1, 2, and 3. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: Naval Air Station, Meridian will remain open. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

#### *Reserve Air Stations*

#### **Naval Air Facility Detroit, Michigan**

*Category: Reserve Air Station*

*Mission: Support for Reserve Units*

*One-time Cost: \$ 11.6 million*

*Savings: 1994-99: \$ 44.8 million*

*Annual: \$ 10.3 million*

*Payback: Immediate*

### SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close Naval Air Facility (NAF), Detroit and relocate its aircraft and associated personnel, equipment and support to the Naval Air Station Jacksonville, Florida and Carswell Air Force Base, Fort Worth, TX. The Mt. Clemons, Michigan Marine Corps Reserve Center will relocate to the Marine Corps Reserve Center, Twin Cities, Minnesota.

### SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

Naval air forces are being reduced consistent with fleet reductions in the DoD Force Structure Plan. Projected force levels reflected for both active and reserve aviation elements leave the Department with significant excess capacity in the reserve air station category. Given the greater

operational activity of active air stations, the decision to rely on reserve aviation elements in support of active operating forces places a high military value on locating reserve aviation elements on active operating air bases to the extent possible. Closure of NAF Detroit will eliminate excess capacity at the reserve air base with the lowest military value and allow relocation of most of its assets to the major P-3 active force base at NAS Jacksonville. In arriving at the recommendation to close NAF Detroit, a specific analysis was conducted to ensure that there was demographic support for purposes of force recruiting in the areas to which the reserve aircraft are being relocated.

### COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community argued the recession and high local unemployment rates compounded with the loss of income generated by both active duty and reserve personnel in the local economy totaled \$50 million. In addition, the local community council integrated NAF Detroit personnel to such an extent that many community youth services (i.e. youth sport leagues, Special Olympics) would suffer a negative impact. The community concern suggested that the relocation of the Medical and Dental Clinics would leave the Midwest devoid of Aviation Medical Assets to provide Navy Flight Physicals for Reserve Officer Training Programs and the Navy Recruiting District offices assigned to recruit aviation personnel in the Midwest. In addition, the community expressed concern regarding the disposition of other tenant commands, including the Personnel Support Detachment and the Personnel Support Detachment, Cleveland, Ohio. Reserve representatives expressed concern about the loss of qualified reservists with a resulting loss of readiness, and they projected it would take eighteen to sixty months to reconstitute reserve squadrons and restore readiness at the projected receiver sites.

The Michigan Air National Guard, the local communities, and the Detroit Wayne County Metropolitan Airport were all opposed to joint use of Selfridge ANG as an air passenger terminal. It stated the base infrastructure and local heavy industry would not support a civilian air cargo operation. Finally, representatives questioned the accuracy of the Navy's cost and savings analysis.

## COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found demographics at receiver locations would effectively support the manning of the reserve squadrons and would place them closer to operating areas. The Commission also found some inconsistencies in COBRA data regarding \$5.7 million in required military construction costs prior to closure. However, this cost did not significantly affect savings. In addition, tenant activities were not specifically addressed in the Secretary's recommendation. However, these activities were all below threshold, and parent commands could designate receiver sites. Finally, the Commission found closure of NAF Detroit significantly reduced excess capacity in Reserve Naval Air Stations. This facility was rated lowest in military value, so consolidation of its assets at receiver sites resulted in an overall improvement in military value.

## COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Naval Air Facility (NAF), Detroit and relocate its aircraft and associated personnel, equipment and support to the Naval Air Station Jacksonville, Florida or Naval Air Station South Weymouth, Massachusetts and Carswell Air Force Base, Fort Worth, TX. The Mt. Clemons, Michigan Marine Corps Reserve Center will relocate to the Marine Corps Reserve Center, Twin Cities, Minnesota.

### Naval Air Facility Martinsburg, West Virginia

*Category: Reserve Air Station*  
*Mission: Support for Reserve Units*  
*One-time Cost: \$27.1 million*  
*Savings: 1994-99: \$70.2 million*  
*Annual: \$13.1 million*  
*Payback: Immediate*

## SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

None. The Commission added this military installation to the list of installations recommended for closure or realignment.

## COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community asserted that a 1986 Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) Study identified Martinsburg as one of four sites for location of Naval Medium/Heavy Airlift (C-130) Squadrons (the others listed were NAS Glenview, NAS New Orleans, and NAS Point Magu). It also indicated that Martinsburg would be more cost efficient to operate both because the Navy would be a tenant of the Air National Guard, and because of the relative low cost-of-living index when compared with other locations. Additionally, it stated that current experience with reserve recruiting and retention in the Air National Guard was indicative of a rich demographic environment that would successfully draw on the greater Washington-Baltimore area to supply qualified personnel. The community noted its central location in Eastern United States, its excellent transportation network, good infrastructure, and relatively uncrowded airspace were attributes that supported the decision to place a C-130 squadron in Martinsburg, West Virginia.

Regarding economic impact, they projected at least 200 full-time positions and 200 reservists positions will be assigned to the Martinsburg Facility. The assignment would have a significant positive impact on one of the poorest sections of West Virginia.

## COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found the construction of this facility is in the planning stages only. No ground has been broken. COBRA runs provided by the Navy for Martinsburg were not useable for comparison with similar existing reserve and active air stations. The assumption that high Air National Guard manning levels are predictors of high Naval Reserve manning levels for this activity presumes there are adequate numbers of qualified naval veterans or civilians with aviation background, or that members of the West Virginia Air National Guard currently awaiting billet assignments would sacrifice seniority to request interservice transfers. While the CNA study identified Martinsburg as one of four sites for location of a Naval Reserve Medium/Heavy Airlift squadron, it was conducted

during a defense build-up. With strategic planning incomplete in this era of fiscal constraints, construction of new facilities in a category with excess capacity does not appear to be a wise use of scarce resources.

#### **COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION**

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from criteria 1, 3, 4 and 5. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Naval Air Facility, Martinsburg, West Virginia. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

#### **Naval Air Station Dallas, Texas**

*Category: Reserve Air Station*  
*Mission: Support Naval Reserve Aviation Units*  
*One-time Cost: \$ 136.5 million*  
*Savings: 1994-99 \$ -108 million (Cost)*  
*Annual: \$ 5.2 million*  
*Payback: 100+ years*

#### **SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION**

Close the Naval Air Station (NAS), Dallas and relocate its aircraft and associated personnel, equipment and support to Carswell Air Force Base, Fort Worth, Texas. The following Navy and Marine Corps Reserve Centers relocate to Carswell Air Force Base: Naval Reserve Center, Dallas, Marine Corp Reserve Center, Dallas, Marine Corps Reserve Center (Wing) Dallas, and REDCOM 11.

#### **SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION**

Naval air forces are being reduced consistent with the fleet reductions in the DoD Force Structure Plan. Projected force levels reflected for both active and reserve aviation elements leave the Navy with significant excess capacity in the reserve air station category. Closure of Naval Air Station, Dallas and reconstitution at Carswell Air Force Base provides the reserves with a significantly superior air base. The resulting air station, with Air Force reserve squadrons now as tenants, will remove the operational difficulties currently experienced at the Naval Air Station, Dallas, including flight conflicts with the civilian airport. This closure, combined with three others in this category,

results in the maximum reduction of excess capacity in reserve air stations while increasing the average military value of the remaining bases in this category.

#### **COMMUNITY CONCERNS**

The community stressed the closure of NAS Dallas would detrimentally impact Vought Aircraft Company, which used the airport for 45 years to test aircraft under a \$1/year agreement with the City of Dallas. It indicated the Navy's concern over lack of airspace was incorrect because the city of Dallas owned all or part of two nearby airports so ample airspace was available. Furthermore only minor transitory problems occasionally occurred.

Regarding economic impact, the community emphasized it would be much greater than the Navy estimated, both in Dallas and in Grand Prairie.

#### **COMMISSION FINDINGS**

The Commission found the proposed realignment of NAS Dallas at Carswell Air Force Base (AFB) had merit because it would alleviate current air and ground encroachment restrictions. The Commission also found regular airlift to southwestern states would increase the recruiting area to support current and future mission capability of the reserve squadrons assigned to NAS Dallas. In addition, the Commission found the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) supported the proposed relocation to Carswell AFB because it was compatible with the existing and future Dallas-Forth Worth Metropolitan Air Traffic System Plan. The FAA indicated the move would result in better service to NAS Dallas units at its new site and would provide improved procedural efficiency to all users. The FAA stated since current air missions from NAS Dallas were to the west and southwest, the proposed relocation to Carswell AFB would shorten mission length and reduce flight costs.

#### **COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION**

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: Close the Naval Air Station (NAS), Dallas and relocate

its aircraft and associated personnel, equipment and support to Carswell AFB, Fort Worth, Texas. The following Navy and Marine Corps Reserve Centers relocate to Carswell: Naval Reserve Center, Dallas, Marine Corp Reserve Center, Dallas, Marine Corps Reserve Center (Wing) Dallas, and REDCOM 11. Carswell AFB, Texas, will become a Navy-operated Carswell joint reserve center to receive and accommodate the reserve units currently there and being relocated there by this 1993 Commission.

### **Naval Air Station Glenview, Illinois**

*Category: Reserve Air Station*

*Mission: Support for Reserve Units*

*One-time Cost: \$ 132.1 million*

*Savings: 1994-99: \$ 34.5 million*

*Annual: \$ 30.0 million*

*Payback: 6 years*

#### **SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION**

Close the Naval Air Station (NAS), Glenview and relocate its aircraft and associated personnel, equipment and support to Navy Reserve, National Guard and other activities. Family housing located at NAS Glenview will be retained to meet existing and new requirements of the nearby Naval Training Center (NTC), Great Lakes. The Recruiting District, Chicago will be relocated to NTC Great Lakes. The Marine Corps Reserve Center activities will relocate as appropriate to Dam Neck, Virginia, Green Bay, Wisconsin, Stewart Army National Guard Facility, New Windsor, New York and NAS, Atlanta, Georgia.

#### **SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION**

Naval air forces are being reduced consistent with the fleet reductions in the DoD Force-Structure Plan. Projected force levels for both active and reserve aviation elements leave the Department with significant excess capacity in the reserve air station category. Closure of NAS Glenview eliminates excess capacity at a base with a very low military value whose assets can be redistributed into more economical and efficient operations. This closure, combined with three others in this category, results in maximum reduction of excess capacity while increasing the average military value of the

remaining reserve air stations. In arriving at the recommendation to close NAS Glenview, a specific analysis was conducted to ensure that there was demographic support for purposes of force recruiting in the areas to which the reserve aircraft are being relocated.

#### **COMMUNITY CONCERNS**

The community contended NAS Glenview demonstrated the ability to recruit and train key reserve personnel from the highly skilled workforce of the Chicago Metroplex. The community said distant relocations proposed for NAS Glenview would undoubtedly result in large losses of qualified reservists in these units, and they highlighted the loss of joint operations. While local officials took a neutral position, other community representatives questioned the military value and excess capacity calculations. It also questioned COBRA model cost and savings analysis and identified over \$90 million in military construction costs to relocate the units. The community leaders pointed out that relocation costs of tenant activities were not included in the COBRA analysis. It indicated the combined closures of this facility along with NAF Detroit and NAS Memphis would leave the heartland of the United States without an operational Naval and Marine Corps Air Reserve presence. Another concern of the community was that these closures would result in a loss of Navy airlift for midwestern reserve units.

#### **COMMISSION FINDINGS**

The Commission found significant efforts had been made to upgrade NAS Glenview. However, serious ground and air encroachment problems, and the lack of adequate accident potential zones limited potential expansion at this Reserve Naval Air Station. While the Commission recognized the loss of reservists due to relocating the reserve squadrons, it found the potential for expansion at receiver sites would improve overall military value of the remaining installations.

#### **COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION**

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close

the Naval Air Station (NAS), Glenview and relocate its aircraft and associated personnel, equipment and support to Navy Reserve, National Guard and other activities. Family housing located at NAS Glenview will be retained to meet existing and new requirements of the nearby Naval Training Center (NTC), Great Lakes. The Recruiting District, Chicago will be relocated to NTC Great Lakes. The Marine Corps Reserve Center activities will relocate as appropriate to Dam Neck, Virginia; Green Bay, Wisconsin; Stewart Army National Guard Facility, New Windsor, New York; and NAS Atlanta, Georgia.

### **Naval Air Station South Weymouth, Massachusetts**

*Category: Reserve Air Station*  
*Mission: Support for Reserve Units*  
*One-time Cost: N/A*  
*Savings: N/A*  
*Annual: N/A*  
*Payback: N/A*

### **SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION**

Close Naval Air Station (NAS), South Weymouth and relocate its aircraft and associated personnel, equipment and support to Naval Air Stations Brunswick, Maine, New Orleans, Louisiana, and Naval Station Mayport, Florida. The Marine Corps Reserve Center activities will relocate to Dam Neck, Virginia, Johnstown, Pennsylvania, Camp Pendleton, California, and NAS Willow Grove, Pennsylvania.

### **SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION**

Naval air forces are being reduced consistent with fleet reductions in the DoD Force Structure Plan. Projected force levels for both active and reserve aviation elements leave the Department with significant excess capacity in the reserve air station category. The greater operational utility of active air stations and the decision to rely on reserve aviation elements in support of active operating forces place a higher military value on locating reserve aviation elements on active operating air bases to the extent possible. Closure of NAS South Weymouth allows the relocation of reserve P-3's to the major P-3 active operating base at NAS Brunswick, ME

and distributes other assets to the active operating base at Mayport, FL and to a reserve air station with a higher military value. In arriving at the recommendation to close NAS South Weymouth, a specific analysis was conducted to ensure that there was demographic support for purposes of force recruiting in the areas to which the reserve aircraft are being relocated.

### **COMMUNITY CONCERNS**

The community stated NAS South Weymouth was the only operational Naval Air Reserve Activity in the New England/New York area. The closure would preclude active participation by aviation qualified Naval Reservists in the northeastern United States, since reservists are geographically connected to the area of their domicile and civilian occupations. The community further stated the Navy military value ranked NAS South Weymouth third of eight, well above NAS Dallas (proposed for realignment), NAS Atlanta and NAF Washington. The community emphasized the combined highly educated technical workforce and large population of qualified veterans in the Boston area support recruitment for both the current mission and any expanded operational role. The proximity to wetlands and community zoning ordinances prevent land encroachment on air operations and further enhance NAS South Weymouth's ability to assume expanded missions.

The community questioned the Navy's programmed new construction in Martinsburg, West Virginia (for a C-130 Medium/Heavy Airlift Squadron); and Johnstown, Pennsylvania (for a Helicopter Squadron). These facilities would cost over \$55 million, with an additional \$50 million in initial set-up costs. It asserted NAS South Weymouth had adequate facilities and a trained manpower pool to assume the proposed missions for these sites, and indeed has facilities and equipment already on board for support of the C-130 aircraft. Further, it indicated NAS South Weymouth was closer to operating and potential threat areas for Anti-Submarine/Anti-Surface Warfare and to carrier battle group operations than any other Reserve Naval Air Station and most operational bases.

The community conducted its own independent analysis of the certified data provided to the

Base Structure Analysis Team and raised serious concerns about the validity of costs and savings projected by the COBRA models developed by the Navy. In addition, it indicated the proposed closures of Reserve Naval Air Stations were predicated on nine Reserve Maritime Patrol Squadrons, not the thirteen Squadrons mandated by the FY93 Defense Authorization Act. It questioned the wisdom of such unprecedented cuts in view of the fact that both Congress and the Department of Defense have not yet defined the role of the reserves.

Regarding the cumulative economic impact, the community asserted New England employs only 13% of the Department of Defense, but had to absorb 33% of recent defense cuts. The community argued the closure of additional bases, including NAS South Weymouth, would have a heavy impact on an economy already struggling under the burdens of coping with previous defense cuts.

#### COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found several inconsistencies between the COBRA analysis and data call submissions regarding personnel accounting, and military construction costs for receiver bases. These inconsistencies tended to inflate savings and deflate costs in favor of the Secretary's recommendation. Additionally, it appeared demographics for the purposes of force recruiting at proposed receiver bases were not considered in the relocation of squadrons attached to this command. There was no evidence current and future mission impacts were considered with respect to the retention losses that could result if squadrons were relocated several hundred to over 3000 miles away from the reservists currently assigned billets in these units. Additionally, no plan was proposed to retain incumbent reservists or to expedite recruitment and training of replacements. Similarly, impacts on contributory support to the active components, mission capability and readiness were not adequately considered by the Navy.

#### COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from the force structure plan and criteria 1, 3, 4, and 5. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: Naval

Air Station, South Weymouth will remain open. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

#### Naval/Marine Corps Air Facility (Joint Aviation Facility) Johnstown, Pennsylvania

*Category: Reserve Air Station*

*Mission: Support for Reserve Units*

*One-time Cost: None*

*Savings: 1994-99: \$ 15-20 million  
(Construction Avoidance)*

*\$ 20 million (Start Up Costs Avoidance)*

*Annual: N/A*

*Payback: N/A*

#### SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

None. The Commission added this military installation to the list of installations recommended for closure or realignment.

#### COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community expressed concern regarding the proposed cessation of construction of a Naval/Marine Corps air facility at the Joint Aviation Facility in Johnstown, PA. The community indicated the facility had strong Congressional support.

#### COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found construction costs for the Navy/Marine Corps addition to the Joint Aviation Facility at Johnstown, PA, were projected at \$15-20 million with an additional \$20 million in one-time start-up costs. The Commission found construction of the Navy/Marine Corps facility was scheduled for FY 1994 with occupancy planned for FY 1996. The Commission found the nearby reserve center in Ebensburg could house administrative units, and significant excess capacity exists in Naval/Marine Corps reserve air stations.

#### COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from criteria 4 and 5. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close (halt construction of) the Naval/

Marine Corps air facility (Joint Aviation Facility) Johnstown, Pennsylvania. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

### **Naval Bases**

#### **Naval Education and Training Center Newport, Rhode Island**

*Category: Naval Base*

*Mission: Support Homeported Ships*

*One-time Cost: \$13.8 million*

*Savings: 1994-99: \$7.94 million*

*Annual: \$ 4.26 million*

*Payback: 5 years*

#### **SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION**

Realign the Naval Education and Training Center (NETC) Newport and terminate the Center's mission to berth ships. Relocate the ships to Naval Station Mayport, Florida and Naval Station Norfolk, Virginia. Piers, waterfront facilities and related property shall be retained by NETC Newport. The Education and Training Center will remain to satisfy its education and training mission.

#### **SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION**

The piers and maintenance activity associated with NETC Newport are excess to the capacity required to support the DoD Force Structure Plan. A comprehensive analysis of naval station berthing capacity was performed with a goal of reducing excess capacity to the maximum extent possible while maintaining the overall military value of the remaining naval stations. To provide berthing to support the projected force structure, the resulting mix of naval stations was configured to satisfy specific mission requirements, including: 100 percent aircraft carrier berthing in each fleet; ammunition ships at ESQD-approved berthing; one SSN/SSBN unique base complex per fleet; and maintenance of the Norfolk and San Diego fleet concentrations. NETC Newport currently berths five ships which can be absorbed at other homeports with a higher military value. This realignment, combined with other recommended closures and realignments in the Atlantic Fleet,

results in the maximum reduction of excess capacity while increasing the average military value of the remaining Atlantic Fleet bases.

#### **COMMUNITY CONCERNS**

The community argued the Navy underrated Newport's military value. The community also questioned the Navy's estimated savings associated with this realignment, expressing belief that the Navy's analysis created a false sense of savings because it did not fully examine the costs of moving ships and maintaining real property. Moreover, the relocation of ships would not reduce excess capacity or operational costs because Newport would still retain its piers. The community also argued the impact on Reserve Training in the Northeast was significant, and the economic impact of the realignment was underestimated.

#### **COMMISSION FINDINGS**

The Commission found the capacity to homeport ships at Newport is excess to that required to support the DoD force structure. The Commission also found closure would account for a relatively small job loss in this employment area and would result in savings.

#### **COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION**

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: realign the Naval Education and Training Center (NETC) Newport and terminate the Center's mission to berth ships. Relocate the ships to Naval Station Mayport, Florida and Naval Station Norfolk, Virginia. Piers, waterfront facilities and related property shall be retained by NETC Newport. The Education and Training Center will remain to satisfy its education and training mission.

#### **Naval Station Charleston, South Carolina**

*Category: Naval Base*

*Mission: Support Homeported Ships*

*One-time Cost: \$ 186.36 million*

*Savings: 1994-99: \$ 146.67 million*

*Annual: \$ 69.78 million*

*Payback: 5 years*

## **SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION**

Close Naval Station (NS), Charleston and relocate assigned ships to Naval Stations, Norfolk, Virginia; Mayport, Florida; Pascagoula, Mississippi; Ingleside, Texas and Submarine Base, Kings Bay, Georgia. Appropriate personnel, equipment and support, to include the drydock, will be relocated with the ships. Disposition of major tenants is as follows: Planning, Estimating, Repair and Alterations (PERA) relocates to Portsmouth, Virginia; the Naval Investigative Service Regional Office disestablishes; Ship Intermediate Maintenance Activity, Charleston disestablishes, and the Naval Reserve Center and REDCOM 7 relocate to leased space in the Charleston area; Fleet and Mine Warfare Training Center relocates to Naval Station Ingleside, Fleet Training Center Mayport, and Fleet Training Center Norfolk; Submarine Training Facility Charleston disestablishes. Family housing located within the Charleston Navy complex will be retained as necessary to support the nearby Naval Weapons Station Charleston.

## **SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION**

The piers and maintenance activity at NS Charleston are excess to the capacity required to support the DoD Force Structure Plan. A comprehensive analysis of naval station berthing capacity was performed with a goal of reducing excess capacity to the maximum extent while maintaining the overall military value of the remaining naval stations. To provide berthing to support projected force structure, the resulting mix of naval stations was configured to satisfy specific mission requirements, including: 100 percent aircraft carrier berthing in each fleet; ammunition ships at ESQD-approved berthing; one SSN/SSBN unique base complex per fleet; and maintenance of the Norfolk and San Diego fleet concentrations as part of the solution. The berths at the NS Charleston are excess to Navy requirements. The relocation of the 21 ships currently based at NS Charleston will allow the closure of this naval base and eliminate almost half of the excess berthing capacity in bases supporting the Atlantic Fleet. This closure, combined with other recommended closures and realignments

in the Atlantic Fleet, results in the maximum reduction of excess capacity while increasing average military value of the remaining Atlantic Fleet Bases.

## **COMMUNITY CONCERNS**

The community stated the Navy underrated Charleston's military value. It believed the haste of the Navy's process resulted in inaccurate and incomplete responses to the Navy's military value matrix questions. The community also believed the Navy underestimated the costs of relocating its activities to Naval Station Kings Bay and Naval Station Ingleside. The community further asserted the ability to obtain the necessary environmental permits for Mine Warfare training in the Gulf of Mexico was questionable. The community also stated the closure of the Naval Station and other facilities in Charleston would have a devastating economic impact on the area.

## **COMMISSION FINDINGS**

The Commission found the capacity to homeport ships and submarines in Charleston is excess to that required to support the DoD force structure. The Commission also found when combined with other Charleston closures, such as the closure of the Charleston Naval Shipyard, the closure of Naval Station Charleston would account for a significant job loss in this employment area; however, closure will result in substantial savings.

## **COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION**

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criterion 1. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Naval Station (NS), Charleston but maintain the option for the 1993 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission later to recommend the retention of Naval Station, Charleston facilities that are deemed necessary to establish or support naval commands that are retained at, realigned to, or relocated to Charleston, South Carolina. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

## **Naval Station Mobile, Alabama**

*Category: Naval Base*  
*Mission: Support Homeported Ships*  
*One-time Cost: \$ 4.88 million*  
*Savings: 1994-99: \$ 66.83 million*  
*Annual: \$ 8.43 million*  
*Payback: 2 years*

### **SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION**

Close Naval Station, Mobile and relocate assigned ships to Naval Stations Pascagoula, Mississippi, and Ingleside, Texas, along with dedicated personnel, equipment and appropriate other support.

### **SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION**

The berths at Naval Station, Mobile are excess to the capacity required to support the DoD Force Structure Plan. A comprehensive analysis of naval station berthing capacity was performed with a goal of reducing excess capacity to the maximum extent possible while maintaining the overall military value of the remaining naval stations. To provide berthing to support the projected force structure, the resulting mix of naval stations were configured to satisfy specific mission requirements, including: 100 percent aircraft carrier berthing in each fleet; ammunition ships at ESQD-approved berthing; one SSN/SSBN unique base complex per fleet; and maintenance of the Norfolk and San Diego fleet concentrations as part of the solution. The ships based at Naval Station Mobile can be relocated to other naval bases which have a higher military value. This realignment, combined with other recommended closures and realignments in the Atlantic Fleet, results in the maximum reduction of excess capacity while increasing the average military value of the remaining Atlantic Fleet bases.

### **COMMUNITY CONCERNS**

The community argued the Navy's military value ranking was inaccurate. The community stated the Navy did not give adequate consideration to the role Naval Station (NAVSTA) Mobile plays in training reserves. The community also felt the Navy did not correctly compare NAVSTA Mobile to NAVSTA Pascagoula. The community claimed Mobile was superior to Pascagoula in the areas of navigation, safety, quality of life

and the Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activity. It believed the Navy greatly overestimated the savings associated with the closure of the base. The community also noted its strong state and local support for the facility and argued the closure of NAVSTA Mobile would have a serious and adverse effect on the community.

### **COMMISSION FINDINGS**

The Commission found the capacity to homeport ships at Mobile is excess to that required to support the DoD force structure. The Commission also found closure would account for a relatively small job loss in this employment area and would result in savings.

### **COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION**

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Naval Station, Mobile and relocate assigned ships to Naval Stations Pascagoula, Mississippi, and Ingleside, Texas, along with dedicated personnel, equipment and appropriate other support.

## **Naval Station Staten Island, New York**

*Category: Naval Base*  
*Mission: Support Homeported Ships*  
*One-time Cost: \$ -16.15 million (Savings)*  
*Savings: 1994-99: \$ 298.92 million*  
*Annual: \$ 42.64 million*  
*Payback: Immediate*

### **SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION**

Close Naval Station Staten Island. Relocate its ships along with their dedicated personnel, equipment and support to Naval Stations, Norfolk, Virginia and Mayport, Florida. Disposition of minor tenants is as follows: Ship Intermediate Maintenance Activity, New York relocates to Farle, New Jersey and Norfolk, Virginia; Recruiting District, New York disestablishes; Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair (SUPSHIP), Brooklyn Detachment disestablishes.

### **SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION**

The berthing capacity of Naval Station Staten Island is excess to the capacity required

to support the DoD Force Structure Plan. A comprehensive analysis of naval station berthing capacity was performed with the goal of reducing excess capacity to the maximum extent possible while maintaining the overall military value of the remaining naval stations. To provide berthing to support projected force structure, the resulting mix of naval stations was configured to satisfy specific mission requirements, including: 100 percent aircraft carrier berthing in each fleet; ammunition ships at FSQD-approved berthing; one SSN/SSBN unique base complex per fleet; and maintenance of the Norfolk and San Diego fleet concentrations. The ships currently berthed at Naval Station Staten Island can be relocated to bases with higher military value. This closure, combined with other recommended closures and realignments in the Atlantic Fleet, results in the maximum reduction of excess capacity while increasing the average military value of the remaining Atlantic Fleet bases.

#### COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community argued the Navy's analytical process was not sound because it contained many procedural errors, analytical inconsistencies and inflated values for certain capabilities. The community also challenged the soundness of the Navy's megaport concept. It believed closing Naval Station (NAVSTA) Staten Island would pose operational problems because New York is four to five days closer to potential conflicts than ports in the Gulf of Mexico. The community claimed the closure of NAVSTA Staten Island would create a loss of significant training opportunity for Naval Reservists, particularly in light of other planned closures in the Northeast. The community felt the Navy did not adequately consider the adverse economic impact the closure of NAVSTA Staten Island would have on the New York Harbor industrial base, especially private shipyards.

#### COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found the capacity to homeport ships at Naval Station Staten Island is excess to that required to support the DoD force structure. The Commission also found closure would account for a relatively small job loss in this employment area and would result in substantial

savings. The Secretary suggested a correction or revision to his March 1993 recommendation. The Commission found that the revised proposal had a higher military value and should be adopted.

#### COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criteria 2. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Naval Station Staten Island. Relocate its ships along with their dedicated personnel, equipment and support to Naval Stations, Norfolk, Virginia and Mayport, Florida. Disposition of minor tenants is as follows: Ship Intermediate Maintenance Activity, New York relocates to Earle, New Jersey and Norfolk, Virginia; Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair (SUPSHIP), Brooklyn Detachment disestablishes. Retain family housing located at Naval Station, Staten Island, as necessary to support Naval Weapons Station, Earle, New Jersey. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

#### Naval Submarine Base New London, Connecticut

*Category: Naval Base*

*Mission: Support Homeported Submarine*

*One-time Cost: N/A*

*Savings: 1994-99: N/A*

*Annual: N/A*

*Payback: N/A*

#### SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Realign Naval Submarine Base (NSB), New London by terminating its mission to homeport ships. Relocate berthed ships, their personnel, associated equipment and other support to the Submarine Base, Kings Bay, Georgia and the Naval Station, Norfolk, Virginia. This relocation is to include a floating drydock. Piers, waterfront facilities, and related property shall be retained by the Navy at New London, Connecticut. The Nuclear Submarine Support Facility, a major tenant, relocates to Kings Bay, Georgia and Norfolk, Virginia; and another major tenant, the Nuclear Power Training Unit, disestablishes.

## SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

Naval Submarine Base, New London's capacity is excess to that required to support the number of ships reflected in the DoD Force Structure Plan. A comprehensive analysis of naval station berthing capacity was performed with a goal of reducing excess capacity to the maximum extent possible while maintaining the overall military value of the remaining naval stations. To provide berthing to support the projected force structure, the resulting mix of naval stations was configured to satisfy specific mission requirements, including: 100 percent aircraft carrier berthing in each fleet; ammunition ships at ESQD-approved berthing; one SSN/SSBN unique base complex per fleet; and maintenance of the Norfolk and San Diego fleet concentrations. With a reduction in ships, the Navy requires one submarine base per Fleet. In view of the capacity at the Submarine Base, Kings Bay and the Naval Station, Norfolk, the submarines based at New London can be relocated to activities with a higher military value. The education and training missions being performed at the Submarine Base, New London will continue to be performed there and the Navy will retain piers, waterfront facilities and related property. This realignment, combined with other recommended closures and realignments in the Atlantic Fleet, results in the maximum reduction of excess capacity while increasing the average military value of the remaining Atlantic Fleet bases.

## COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community claimed the Navy's proposal to realign New London did not reduce excess capacity. Instead, it only duplicated existing resources elsewhere and therefore wasted the taxpayers' money. The community also questioned the Navy's configuration analysis. The Navy's analysis required that (1) Norfolk be a part of any solution and (2) there be only one SSBN/SSN unique base per fleet. The community claimed these rules led the Navy to exclude New London automatically from any solution. The community argued the Navy's analysis thus appeared to be used to justify its previous judgment to exclude New London. The community questioned the strategic gain and increase in military value resulting from the realignment of New London, since military value did not

appear to be a part of the Navy's configuration analysis. The community proposed an alternate plan involving retaining submarines that would ostensibly save \$1.2 billion. The community also stated the economic effect of the realignment would be grave because the New London area is heavily dependent on defense industries.

## COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found the Secretary of Defense's recommendation to terminate Naval Submarine Base (SUBBASE) New London's mission to homeport submarines calls for substantial military construction (MILCON) at SUBBASE King's Bay and Naval Station Norfolk to replace capabilities and facilities that exist in New London. The Commission further found the Navy's analysis was very sensitive to one-time costs due to the sizeable MILCON, particularly in view of what costs the Navy deemed appropriate to consider. Just prior to final deliberations, the Chairman of the Navy's Base Structure Evaluation Committee reported to the Commission that the Navy was not likely ever to move attack submarines to Kings Bay.

## COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criteria 2, 4, and 5. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: Naval Submarine Base, New London remains open and does not realign. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

## Naval Air Station Alameda, California

*Category: Naval Base*

*Mission: Support of Aviation Activities,  
Afloat Units, and Other Activities*

*One-time Cost: \$ 193.69 million*

*Savings: 1994-99: \$ -72.17 million (Cost)*

*Annual: \$ 41.69 million*

*Payback: 10 years*

## SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close Naval Air Station (NAS), Alameda, California and relocate its aircraft along with the dedicated personnel, equipment and support to NASA Ames/Moffett Field, California and NAS North Island. In addition, those ships currently berthed

at NAS Alameda will be relocated to the Fleet concentrations at San Diego and Bangor/Puget Sound/Everett. Disposition of major tenants is as follows: Navy Regional Data Automation Center, San Francisco realigns to NAS North Island; Ship Intermediate Maintenance Department disestablishes; the Naval Air Reserve Center and the Marine Corps Reserve Center relocate to leased space at NASA/Ames.

#### **SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION**

The projected carrier air wing reductions in the DoD Force Structure Plan require a significant decrease in air station and naval station capacity. NAS Alameda is recommended for closure as it has the lowest military value of those air stations supporting the Pacific Fleet. Given the number of aircraft "bedded down" at the air station, it has greatest amount of excess capacity. Also, given the need to eliminate excess ship berthing, its capacity is not required to meet force levels, since no more than five carrier berths are required on the West Coast; three at the fleet concentration in San Diego and two at Bangor/Puget Sound/Everett. Both the limited aircraft (primarily reserve) and ship assets at NAS Alameda can be readily absorbed at bases with a higher military value. This closure results in an increased average military value of both the remaining air stations and naval stations in the Pacific Fleet.

#### **COMMUNITY CONCERNS**

The community believed the Navy penalized NAS Alameda's military value ranking because the Navy evaluated Alameda as a naval air station when its capabilities more closely resemble those of a naval station. The community criticized the Navy's plan to build at NAVSTA Everett and NAS North Island to replace existing capabilities at NAS Alameda; it said the Navy underestimated the costs of closing at Alameda and rebuilding elsewhere. The community also asserted that both Everett and North Island required dredging and building nuclear carrier piers and that the licensing and environmental procedures are difficult. The community argued that even if this costly construction were completed, Everett would not have a contiguous airfield while NAS Alameda does, asserting the presence of a contiguous airfield creates a synergism among the facilities at Alameda.

By contrast, the absence of a contiguous airfield would pose potentially significant operational problems at Everett.

#### **COMMISSION FINDINGS**

The Commission found the aircraft beddown capacity and ship berthing at NAS Alameda is excess to that required to support the DoD force structure. The Commission also found NAS Alameda had the lowest military value as a Naval Air Station in the Pacific fleet. While its military value as a Naval Station is relatively high, its primary purpose is the homeporting of nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, and there is sufficient carrier berthing capacity in San Diego, Puget Sound, and Everett. Substantial military construction (MILCON) is occurring at Naval Station, Everett, Washington, and Naval Air Station North Island, California, to replace a portion of the nuclear aircraft carrier berthing capacity that exists at Alameda. These MILCON projects are being accomplished separate from the base closure process and will ultimately result in the Navy's ability to homeport aircraft carriers at a reduced cost.

In a letter dated June 1, 1993, the Chief of Naval Operations advised the Commission that the original Secretary of Defense recommendation to close Naval Air Station Alameda did not fully distinguish between active duty aviation assets and tenant reserved aviation assets. That distinction is made clear in the Commission recommendation.

#### **COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION**

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Naval Air Station (NAS), Alameda, California and relocate its aircraft along with the dedicated personnel, equipment and support to NAS North Island. In addition, those ships currently berthed at NAS Alameda will be relocated to the Fleet concentrations at San Diego and Bangor/Puget Sound/Everett. Disposition of major tenants is as follows: Reserve aviation assets relocate to NASA Ames/Moffett Field, California, NAS Whidbey Island, and NAS Willow Grove; Navy Regional Data Automation Center, San Francisco

realigns to NAS North Island; Ship Intermediate Maintenance Department disestablishes; the Naval Air Reserve Center and the Marine Corps Reserve Center relocate to leased space at NAS/Ames.

### **Naval Station Treasure Island, California**

*Category: Naval Base*

*Mission: Maintain and Operate Facilities  
and Support Tenant Activities*

*One-time Cost: \$ 30.95 million*

*Savings: 1994-99: \$ 123.0 million*

*Annual: \$ 44.48 million*

*Payback: 3 years*

#### **SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION**

Close Naval Station, Treasure Island and relocate personnel, as appropriate to the Naval Station, San Diego, California; Naval Amphibious Base, Little Creek, Virginia; Naval Training Center, Great Lakes, Illinois and various Naval Reserve sites in California. Major tenants are impacted as follows: Naval Reserve Center San Francisco relocates to the Naval/Marine Corps Reserve Center, Alameda, California and REDCOM 20 relocates to the Naval Reserve Center, San Bruno, California. Naval Technical Training Center relocates to Fleet Training Center San Diego, Naval Amphibious School, Little Creek and Naval Training Center Great Lakes.

#### **SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION**

The DoD Force Structure Plan supports a decrease in naval station capacity. Naval Station, Treasure Island has a relatively low military value and its capacity is not required to support Navy requirements. The naval bases to which its activities will be relocated have higher military value to the Navy than does this naval station. A comprehensive analysis of naval station berthing capacity was performed with a goal of reducing excess capacity to the maximum extent possible while maintaining the overall military value of the remaining naval stations. To provide berthing to support the projected force structure, the resulting mix of naval stations was configured to satisfy specific mission requirements, including: 100 percent aircraft carrier berthing in each fleet; ammunition ships at ESQD-approved

berthing; one SSN/SSBN unique base complex per fleet, and maintenance of the Norfolk and San Diego fleet concentrations. This closure, combined with other recommended closures and realignments in the Pacific Fleet, reduces excess capacity while increasing the average military value of the remaining Pacific Fleet bases.

#### **COMMUNITY CONCERNS**

The community argued the closure of Naval Station (NAVSTA) Treasure Island, along with the other proposed Bay Area closures, would destroy the strategic infrastructure of the San Francisco area. It pointed out NAVSTA Treasure Island had a new fire fighting school that was environmentally sound and was the only one of its kind on the West Coast. It was also the site of over 1,000 family housing units and other support services the military retirement community depended upon heavily, particularly in light of the closure of the Presidio of San Francisco.

#### **COMMISSION FINDINGS**

The Commission found the capacity to homeport ships at Naval Station Treasure Island was excess to that required to support the DoD force structure. Further, the Commission found the primary purposes of NAVSTA Treasure Island are to provide military family housing, some training and other support for shipboard personnel and dependents in the San Francisco Bay area. In view of the recommendations to close NAS Alameda, these facilities are not required.

#### **COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION**

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Naval Station, Treasure Island and relocate personnel, as appropriate to the Naval Station, San Diego, California; Naval Amphibious Base, Little Creek, Virginia; Naval Training Center, Great Lakes, Illinois and various Naval Reserve sites in California. Major tenants are impacted as follows: Naval Reserve Center San Francisco relocates to the Naval/Marine Corps Reserve Center, Alameda, California and REDCOM 20 relocates to the Naval Reserve Center, San Bruno,

California. Naval Technical Training Center relocates to Fleet Training Center San Diego, Naval Amphibious School, Little Creek and Naval Training Center Great Lakes.

### **Naval Training Centers**

#### **Naval Training Center Orlando, Florida**

*Category: Naval Training Center*

*Mission: Training of Officer and Enlisted Personnel*

*One-time Cost: \$ 374 million*

*Savings: 1994-99: \$ -83.5 million (cost) annual: \$ 75.8 million*

*Payback: 9 years*

*(These cost figures include the cost to close NTC San Diego.)*

#### **SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION**

Close the Naval Training Center (NTC), Orlando, and relocate certain personnel, equipment and support to NTC Great Lakes and other locations, consistent with DoD training requirements. Disposition of major tenants is as follows: Recruit Training Command relocates to NTC Great Lakes; the Nuclear Power School and the Nuclear "A" School relocate to the Submarine School at the Naval Submarine Base (NSB), New London; Personnel Support Detachment relocates to NTC Great Lakes; Service School Command relocates to Great Lakes; Naval Dental Clinic relocates to Great Lakes; Naval Education and Training Program Management Support Activity disestablishes.

#### **SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION**

The 1991 Commission rejected the recommendation to close NTC Orlando due to prohibitive closure costs. This recommendation encompasses the additional closure of NTC San Diego and proposes significantly reduced closure costs by taking advantage of facilities made available by the recommended realignment of NSB New London. Projected manpower reductions contained in the DoD Force Structure Plan require a substantial decrease in naval force structure. As a result of projected manpower levels the Navy has two to three times the capacity required, as measured by a variety of indicators,

to perform the recruit training function. The closure of the NTC Orlando removes excess capacity and relocates training to a naval training center with a higher military value and results in an efficient collocation of the Submarine School, the Nuclear Power School and the Nuclear "A" School at the NSB, New London. The resulting consolidation at the NTC Great Lakes not only results in the highest possible military value for this group of military activities but also is the most economical alignment for the processing of personnel into the Navy. In addition, NTC Orlando has equipment and facilities which are more readily relocated to another naval training center.

#### **COMMUNITY CONCERNS**

The Orlando community argued the Navy's goal to eliminate the greatest amount of excess capacity while maintaining and/or improving overall military value did not necessarily generate the most cost-effective option. The community also maintained the various COBRA alternatives it generated showed a net present value for NTC Orlando 2-4 times greater than the Navy's recommendation. The community claimed the climate affects utility costs, impacts training routines and student morale; however, the Navy did not consider climate a relevant training factor.

The Orlando community also maintained the Navy's military-value questionnaire was flawed because it did not accurately evaluate the training center's capability. The community emphasized the questions asked were not relevant and there were more negative than positive responses to the questions. Further, the community added that NTC Orlando's military value was incorrectly judged to be lower than NTC Great Lakes and utility costs and cost of operations were not included in the military value calculations.

The community also stressed the Navy did not know the true cost of relocating or replicating NTC Great Lakes's engineering "hot-plant" trainers but still justified its decision in large part on the prohibitive cost of moving or rebuilding these trainers. As an example, the community mentioned training simulators could be used to replace "hot-plant" trainers at a fraction of the cost of the "hot plants".

## COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found the Secretary's closure recommendation was consistent with force-structure plan. Closure of NTC Orlando would contribute to the elimination of excess training capacity which is 2-3 times greater than the projected requirement. The Commission accepted the Navy's argument that consolidation of naval training at a single training site allows DoD to generate savings through the reduction of overhead expenses and the elimination of redundant training staff. Consolidation of naval training at NTC Orlando would have required a substantial capital investment which the Commission questioned whether an acceptable return on investment could be realized. The Commission found relocation or replacement of NTC Great Lakes engineering propulsion systems ("hot plants") at another NTC would result in an extended period when training could not be effectively conducted. In addition, the Commission found NTC Great Lakes provides facilities and personnel support for numerous tenants and regional reserve units which could not be economically replaced.

## COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close the Naval Training Center (NTC), Orlando, and relocate certain personnel, equipment, and support to NTC Great Lakes and other locations, consistent with DoD training requirements. Disposition of major tenants is as follows: Recruit Training Command relocates to NTC Great Lakes; the Nuclear Power School and the Nuclear "A" School relocate to the Submarine School at the Naval Submarine Base (NSB), New London; Personnel Support Detachment relocates to NTC Great Lakes; Service School Command relocates to Great Lakes; Naval Dental Clinic relocates to Great Lakes; Naval Education and Training Program Management Support Activity disestablishes.

## Naval Training Center San Diego, California

*Category: Naval Training Center*

*Mission: Training of Officer and Enlisted Personnel*

*One-time Cost: \$ 374 million*

*Savings: 1994-99: \$ -83.5 Million (Cost)*

*Annual: \$ 75.8 million*

*Payback: 9 years*

*(These cost figures also include the cost to close NTC Orlando.)*

## SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close the Naval Training Center (NTC), San Diego, and relocate certain personnel, equipment, and support to NTC Great Lakes, and other locations, consistent with training requirements. Disposition of major tenants is as follows: Recruit Training Command relocates to NTC, Great Lakes; Branch Medical Clinic relocates to Submarine Base, San Diego; Naval Recruiting District relocates to Naval Air Station, North Island; Service School Command (Electronic Warfare) relocates to Naval Training Center, Great Lakes; Service School Command (Surface) relocates to NTC Great Lakes; the remainder of the Service School Command relocates to NTC Great Lakes, Naval Air Station Pensacola, and Fleet Training Center, San Diego.

## SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

Projected manpower reductions contained in the DoD Force Structure Plan require a substantial decrease in naval force structure capacity. As a result of projected manpower levels, the Navy has two to three times the capacity required, as measured by a variety of indicators, to perform the recruit training function. The closure of NTC San Diego removes unneeded excess capacity and results in the realignment of training to a training center with a higher military value. The resulting consolidation at NTC Great Lakes not only results in the highest possible military value but also is the most economical alignment for the processing of personnel into the Navy. In addition, NTC San Diego has equipment and facilities which can more readily be relocated to another naval training center.

## COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community argued NTC San Diego would be the best option for single-site naval training for several reasons. First, San Diego is collocated with the fleet. This allows for more cost-efficient training because it permits quick filling of vacant training billets and greater interaction between operational training units. Furthermore, consolidating naval training at NTC San Diego would eliminate the need for large, recurring transportation costs, since 88% of NTC San Diego's instructors come from San Diego-based units. Retaining naval training in a fleet-concentration area would also produce a higher quality of life for NTC personnel, since fewer sailors would have to be separated from their families. Reduced family separation increases retention rates which, in turn, lowers training costs. The community also stated NTC San Diego had the capacity and land space to accept additional naval training with minimal military construction.

## COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found the Secretary's closure recommendations were consistent with projected force-structure reductions. Closure of NTC San Diego would contribute to the elimination of excess training capacity, which is two to three times greater than the projected requirement. The Commission accepts the Navy's argument consolidation of naval training at a single training site allows DoD to generate savings through the reduction of overhead expenses and the elimination of redundant training staff. The Commission found NTC San Diego possesses less available land to absorb training requirements than the Navy's two other training centers and would be severely constrained during periods of mobilization or surge.

The Secretary of Defense suggested a revision to his original March 1993 recommendation. The Commission found the revised proposal had a higher military value and should be adopted.

## COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from criteria 1 and 2. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: Close Naval Training Center (NTC),

San Diego. Relocate certain personnel, equipment and support to NTC Great Lakes, and other locations, consistent with training requirements. Disposition of major tenants is as follows: Recruit Training Command relocates to NTC, Great Lakes; Branch Medical Clinic relocates to Submarine Base, San Diego; Naval Recruiting District relocates to Naval Air Station North Island; Service School Command (Electronic Warfare) relocates to Naval Training Center, Great Lakes; Service School Command (Surface) relocates to NTC Great Lakes; the remainder of the Service School Command relocates to NTC Great Lakes, Naval Air Station Pensacola, and the Fleet Training Center, San Diego. The co-generation plant and the bachelor quarters and adjacent non-appropriated fund activities (marinas) located aboard NTC San Diego property will be retained by the Navy to support other naval activities in the San Diego area. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

## Naval Aviation Depots

### Naval Aviation Depot Alameda, California

*Category: Naval Aviation Depot*  
*Mission: Aviation Depot Level Maintenance*  
*One-time Cost: \$ 171 million*  
*Savings: 1994-99: \$ 116 million*  
*Annual: \$ 78 million*  
*Payback: 5 years*

## SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATIONS

Close Naval Aviation Depot (NADEP), Alameda and relocate repair capability as necessary to other depot maintenance activities. This relocation may include personnel, equipment and support. The depot workload will move to other depot maintenance activities, including the private sector.

## SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

Naval Aviation Depot, Alameda is recommended for closure because its capacity is excess to that required to support the DoD Force Structure Plan. Projected reductions require an almost 50 percent reduction in capacity in the Navy aviation depots. In determining the mix of aviation depots which would achieve the maximum

reduction in excess capacity, the Navy determined that there must be at least one aviation depot at a fleet concentration on each coast. The work performed at Naval Aviation Depot, Alameda can be performed at other aviation maintenance activities, including the private sector. The closure of NADEP Alameda will reduce excess capacity in this category and maintain or increase the average military value of the remaining depots.

#### **COMMUNITY CONCERNS**

The community asserted NADEP Alameda had several unique capabilities and capacities, including significant engineering and technical support and extensive synergy with the aircraft carriers berthed at NAS Alameda. Community representatives stated these and other uncredited special skills and equipment should have given them a much higher military value than the one determined by the Navy. In addition, several of the NADEP's facilities are new and environmentally sound. Further, they noted that NADEP Alameda has an extremely diverse work force.

The community feels the Navy COBRA analysis did not provide a sufficient estimate of the number or extent of real costs in closing their operations. It believed the costs to close NADEP Alameda were the greatest, while they asserted NADEP Jacksonville was the easiest and least expensive NADEP to close. It also noted Alameda had the Navy's largest amount of missile work. Finally, Alameda had been selected to provide maintenance services to a large amount of Army equipment that could be placed in Oakland, California as part of a proposed prepositioning plan.

#### **COMMISSION FINDINGS**

The Commission found excess capacity in the depot category indicated that three NADEPs should be closed. In evaluating combinations of open and closed NADEPs, the closure of Alameda resulted in less disruption, and lower costs. The combination of other NADEPs selected to remaining open provided a better overall savings, military value and reduction of excess capacity.

The Commission found NADEP Alameda had many new, environmentally sound facilities, a

very diverse workforce, a number of unique capabilities, and provided a valuable synergy with local Navy activities. The Commission also found NADEP Alameda had higher military value than credited by the Navy. Nevertheless, NADEP Alameda is the most expensive NADEP in terms of overall rates, and its operations can easily be absorbed by the remaining NADEPs. The requirement for a West Coast NADEP is more appropriately met by NADEP North Island due to its collocation with the San Diego Megaport and lower overall rates.

NADEP Alameda was dependant on the continued operation of the Naval Air Station Alameda. Without it, the NADEP would incur the extra operating costs associated with the required airfield. Due to the Commission's recommendation to close NAS Alameda, NADEP Alameda will lose its tenant status and ability to operate cost competitively.

#### **COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION**

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Naval Aviation Depot (NADEP), Alameda and relocate repair capability as necessary to other depot maintenance activities. This relocation may include personnel, equipment and support. The depot workload will move to other depot maintenance activities, including the private sector.

#### **Naval Aviation Depot Norfolk, Virginia**

*Category: Naval Aviation Depot*  
*Mission: Depot Level Aviation Maintenance*  
*One-time Cost: \$ 226 million*  
*Savings: 1994-99: \$ 158 million*  
*Annual: \$ 108 million*  
*Payback: 5 years*

#### **SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION**

Close Naval Aviation Depot (NADEP), Norfolk and relocate repair capability as necessary to other depot maintenance activities. This relocation may include personnel, equipment and support. The Depot workload will move to other depot maintenance activities, including the private sector.

## SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

Naval Aviation Depot Norfolk is recommended for closure because its capacity is excess to that required to support the DoD Force Structure Plan. Projected reductions require an almost 50 percent reduction in capacity in the Navy aviation depots. In determining the mix of aviation depots which would achieve the maximum reduction in excess capacity, the Navy determined that there must be at least one aviation depot at a fleet concentration on each coast. The work performed at NADEP, Norfolk can be performed at other aviation maintenance activities, including the private sector. While the military value of the Naval Aviation Depot, Norfolk was not substantially less than that of the Naval Aviation Depots at Cherry Point and Jacksonville, those NADEPs possess unique features and capabilities which required their retention. The closure of NADEP Norfolk will reduce excess capacity in this category and maintain or increase the average military value of the remaining depots.

## COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community stressed NADEP Norfolk's military value score did not properly credit its assets and capabilities. Also, with the concentration of air and sea assets in the Norfolk area, the community argued having a NADEP in Norfolk provided a valuable synergy which resulted in cost and service efficiencies. The community claimed NADEP Norfolk had the lowest labor costs compared to its counterparts, and the very high rate used by the Navy was incorrect. In addition, community representatives challenged the Navy's justification that NADEP Norfolk was chosen instead of Cherry Point because NADEP Cherry Point had unique composite capabilities. Finally, the community asserted closing three NADEPs would eliminate too much of the Navy's in-house capacity; therefore, a maximum of two NADEPs should be closed.

## COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found excess capacity in the depot category which indicated three NADEPs should be closed. The Commission agreed with the Navy's military judgement that one NADEP

must be maintained on each coast. The Commission evaluated scenarios which corrected the high rates used by the Navy.

It also considered the results of other management decisions which would have unfairly disadvantaged NADEP Norfolk's comparison to other NADEPs. Even after cost adjustments, an objective evaluation and, given the Navy's requirement for a NADEP on each coast, the Commission found the closure of NADEP Norfolk resulted in less disruption and lower costs.

## COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Naval Aviation Depot (NADEP), Norfolk and relocate repair capability as necessary to other depot maintenance activities. This relocation may include personnel, equipment and support. The Depot workload will move to other depot maintenance activities, including the private sector.

### Naval Aviation Depot Pensacola, Florida

*Category: Naval Aviation Depot*

*Mission: Depot Level Aviation Maintenance*

*One-time Cost: \$ 214 million*

*Savings: 1994-99: \$71 million*

*Annual: \$ 51 million*

*Payback: 5 years*

## SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close Naval Aviation Depot Pensacola (NADEP), and relocate repair capability as necessary to other depot maintenance activities. This relocation may include personnel, equipment and support. The Depot workload will move to other depot maintenance activities, including the private sector. The dynamic component and rotor blade repair facility will remain in place.

## SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

Naval Aviation Depot, Pensacola is recommended for closure because its capacity is excess to that required to support the DoD Force Structure Plan. Projected reductions require an almost

50 percent reduction in capacity in the Navy aviation depots. In determining the mix of aviation depots which would achieve the maximum reduction in excess capacity the Navy determined that there must be at least one aviation depot at a fleet concentration on each coast. The work performed at Naval Aviation Depot, Pensacola can be performed at other aviation maintenance activities, including the private sector. The closure of NADEP Alameda will reduce excess capacity in this category and maintain or increase the average military value of the remaining depots.

### COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community suggested the process to determine NADEP Pensacola's military value was flawed and deserved a much higher value. It noted closing NADEP Pensacola would be a major loss to the Navy. It has an extremely diverse workforce, performs a high level of interservice work, and has skills in the repair and maintenance of rotary-wing aircraft and dynamic components. Its current configuration is already able to handle the new V-22 Osprey. In addition, they asserted no other facility could absorb their workload without new construction, especially for a whirl tower to handle the largest helicopter's blades.

The community proposed all of the Navy's rotary-wing workload be moved to Pensacola. This scenario, according to their estimates, would provide more savings for the Navy.

### COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found NADEP Pensacola's military value should have been higher due to its high level of interservice work, special skills and equipment, unique capabilities for doing rotary wing work, and diverse workforce. The Commission evaluated the unique capabilities of NADEP Pensacola in a variety of scenarios to quantify the cost and disruption of closing NADEP Pensacola. The Commission evaluation noted the need for construction at the receiving facilities in order to accommodate Pensacola's workload and unique equipment. However, the construction cost was not excessive, and did not significantly degrade the potential savings derived from closing the NADEP.

The Commission also found the cost to construct a new whirl tower and to accommodate Pensacola's dynamic component workload at NADEP Cherry Point or Corpus Christi Army Depot, was far less than the costs associated with keeping these activities at Pensacola. Therefore, the Commission found it was more economical and cost effective to close NADEP Pensacola completely.

In evaluating various closure scenarios, the Commission found closing NADEP Pensacola resulted in less disruption and lower costs. The combination of other NADEPs remaining open provided a better overall savings, military value and excess capacity reduction.

The Commission found that the Navy considered interservicing possibilities when analyzing base closure costs. The Navy intended to interservice some of its rotary wing work from NADEP Pensacola to the Corpus Christi Army Depot, and to transfer work it was doing on Air Force helicopters to NADEP Cherry Point. The Commission analyzed projected rotary wing workload forecasts and found excess capacity existed at both the Corpus Christi and Cherry Point Depots. Accordingly, the Commission agreed with the Navy plan to interservice H-60 and H-1 rotary wing workload to Corpus Christi Army Depot under a depot maintenance interservicing agreement. The Commission also agreed transferring the H-2, H-3 and H-53 rotary wing workload to NADEP Cherry Point was sound policy. This plan would increase facility utilization rates and contribute to reduced overall hourly operating costs for both of the receiving depots.

### COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from criteria 4 and 5. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close the Naval Aviation Depot at Pensacola, and relocate repair and maintenance capabilities for H-1 and H-60 helicopters to Corpus Christi Army Depot, and the remaining repair and maintenance activities to the NADEP at Cherry Point. This relocation will include the personnel and equipment needed to accommodate the new work. In addition, the Commission recommends that the whirl tower and

dynamic component facility be moved to Cherry Point Navy or Corpus Christi Army Depots or the private sector, in lieu of the Navy's plan to retain these operations in a stand-alone facility at NADEP Pensacola. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

### **Naval Inventory Control Points**

#### **Aviation Supply Office, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania**

*Category: Inventory Control Point*  
*Mission: Naval Aviation Logistical Support*  
*One-time Cost: N/A*  
*Savings: N/A*  
*Annual: N/A*  
*Payback: N/A*

#### **SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION**

Close the Aviation Supply Office (ASO), Philadelphia, Pennsylvania and relocate necessary personnel, equipment and support to the Ship Parts Control Center (SPCC), Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania.

#### **SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION**

The reductions in the DoD Force Structure Plan equate to a significant workload reduction for the Navy's inventory control points. Since there is excess capacity in this category the Navy decided to consolidate their two inventory control points at one location. A companion consideration was the relocation of the Naval Supply Systems Command from its present location in leased space in the National Capital Region, to a location at which it could be collocated with major subordinate organizations. This major consolidation of a headquarters with its operational components can be accomplished at SPCC, Mechanicsburg with a minimum of construction and rehabilitation. The end result is a significantly more efficient and economical organization.

#### **COMMUNITY CONCERNS**

The Philadelphia community claimed the military value assessment for ASO Philadelphia focused on the installation and geography

instead of on the intellectual capacity and experience of the managers. In addition, the community maintained the ASO's management efficiency, which amounted to just 5% of material cost, was not considered in the service analysis. The community also emphasized savings were overstated because they did not reflect the cost of operating the ASO.

The community pointed out ASO Philadelphia was a model of innovation and cost-saving techniques, and movement would require years to train a new work force to accomplish the same results. The community also stated that a consolidation of other activities in Philadelphia at the ASO compound would save \$350 million.

#### **COMMISSION FINDINGS**

The Commission found the savings to be realized by moving the Naval Aviation Supply Office were exaggerated since the ASO Compound in North Philadelphia would remain open even after ASO departed, and the facility's operating costs were not included in the cost analysis. The Commission did not find a significant synergy from collocating the ASO with the SPCC in Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania. The cumulative economic impact on Philadelphia was also found to be severe, with no appreciable savings to the Department of Defense.

#### **COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION**

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criteria 4, 5, 6. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: the Naval Aviation Supply Office, Philadelphia, PA, remains open. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

### **Technical Centers (SPAWAR)**

#### **Naval Air Warfare Center-Aircraft Division, Trenton, New Jersey**

*Category: Technical Center*  
*Mission: Research, Development, Testing,  
and Evaluation Support*  
*One-time Cost: \$97.0 million*  
*Savings: 1994-1999: \$31.0 million*  
*Annual: \$ 19.3 million*  
*Payback: 11 years*

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
RECOMMENDATION**

Close the Aircraft Division of the Naval Air Warfare Center (NAWC) Trenton, New Jersey, and relocate appropriate functions, personnel, equipment and support to the Arnold Engineering Development Center, Tullahoma, Tennessee, and the Naval Air Warfare Center, Patuxent River, Maryland.

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION**

This technical center is recommended for closure because its capacity is excess to that required by the DoD Force Structure Plan. There is excess capacity in this category based on a comparison of budgeted workload during the period 1986-1995 and the FY 1995 budgeted workload. A review of the Navy budget displays a clear decline in the period 1995-1999. As the work declines, the excess capacity increases thereby requiring a reduction in facilities and personnel. The technical centers throughout the Department of the Navy currently have significant excess capacity as these technical centers were established and sized to support significantly higher naval force levels and require resource levels greatly in excess of those projected if all resources are to be fully employed. Given this excess capacity and the imbalance with force and resource levels, it is imperative to realign and compress wherever possible so that the remaining technical centers will have the greater military value to the Department of the Navy. The closure of the Trenton Detachment completes a realignment of NAWCs approved by the 1991 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, with continuing reductions in forces being supported and in resource levels. Further consolidations are required so that we may have the most efficient and economic operation.

**COMMUNITY CONCERNS**

The community argued Arnold Engineering Development Center (AEDC) does not have the capacity to assume NAWC's workload. The community questioned the ability of AEDC and Patuxent River to handle the increased workload resulting from the 1991 base closure decision to move work out of Trenton. The community also pointed to the private sector's increasing

interest in getting out of the testing business, directing their work to DoD, and making it more difficult for AEDC to handle the workload. The community also asserted AEDC receives a substantial subsidy from the Tennessee Valley Authority; should this subsidy be rescinded, the cost for AEDC to do business would increase significantly.

**COMMISSION FINDINGS**

The Commission found that, unlike many of the facilities looked at during the process, the NAWC at Trenton was fully utilized. The Commission also found there is some risk the receiving facilities would not be able to handle the increased workload. However, private-sector capability offsets this potential risk. In sum, the Commission found receiving installations, and the private sector, could accommodate the workload from NAWC, Trenton.

**COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION**

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria and, therefore, the Commission adopts the following recommendation of the Secretary of Defense: Close the Aircraft Division of the Naval Air Warfare Center (NAWC) Trenton, New Jersey, and relocate appropriate functions, personnel, equipment and support to the Arnold Engineering Development Center, Tullahoma, Tennessee, and the Naval Air Warfare Center, Patuxent River, Maryland.

**Naval Air Technical Services Facility  
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania**

*Category: Technical Center*  
*Mission: Technical Publication Support*  
*One-time Cost: N/A*  
*Savings: N/A*  
*Annual: N/A*  
*Payback: N/A*

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
RECOMMENDATION**

Close the Naval Air Technical Services Facility, Philadelphia and relocate certain personnel, equipment and support to the new Naval Air Systems Command Headquarters, Patuxent River, Maryland.

## SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

Projected reductions in the DoD Force Structure Plan results in a decrease in required technical center capacity. Budget levels and the number of operating forces being supported by technical centers continue to decline. The technical centers throughout the Department of the Navy currently have significant excess capacity as these technical centers were established and sized to support significantly higher force levels and require resource levels greatly in excess of those projected. Given this excess capacity and the imbalance with force and resource levels, it is imperative to realign and consolidate wherever possible so that the remaining technical centers will have the greater military value to the DoD. Closure of the Technical Services Facility eliminates excess capacity and allows the consolidation of necessary functions at the new headquarters concentration for the Naval Air Systems Command producing economies and efficiencies in the management of assigned functions. This consolidation will also incorporate the Depot Operation Center and the Aviation Maintenance Office currently at Patuxent River.

## COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community noted NATSF and the Aviation Supply Office, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, have developed a synergistic relationship in putting logistics and technical documentation together. The community cited the potential for establishing at the facility a central DoD technical publications organization. Such an organization could eliminate duplicate workload among the Services and, thus, save money. Further, the community claimed that by remaining in Philadelphia along with other interservice organizations, NATSF would maintain a high degree of perceived impartiality. In contrast, moving to NAS Patuxent River would make NATSF appear to be a Navy organization.

## COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found DoD had not adequately addressed the true costs and potential savings of the proposed action. The Commission found after segregating this action into a discreet set of numbers, the one-time cost of \$22 million, coupled with a steady state savings of only \$800

thousand, made this an economically unsound recommendation. Additionally, the Commission found compelling the potential cost savings and reduction in workload among the Services of establishing a joint organization under the auspices of NATSF.

## COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criteria 1 and 4. Therefore, the Commission adopts the following recommendation: the Naval Technical Services Facility, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, remains open. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

### Naval Civil Engineering Laboratory Port Hueneme, California

Category: Technical Center

*Mission: Facility Engineering Studies*

*One-time Cost: \$ 27.0 million*

*Savings: 1994-99: \$7.4 million*

*Annual: \$37.3 million*

*Payback: 8 years*

## SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close this technical center and realign necessary functions, personnel, equipment, and support at the Construction Battalion Center, Port Hueneme, California.

## SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

Naval Civil Engineering Laboratory (NCEL) is recommended for closure because its capacity is excess to that required by the DoD Force Structure Plan. There is excess capacity in this category based on a comparison of budgeted workload during the period 1986-1995 and the FY 1995 budgeted workload. A review of the Navy budget displays a clear decline in the period 1995-1999. Thus, as the work declines, the excess capacity increases thereby requiring a reduction in facilities and personnel. The technical centers throughout the Department of the Navy currently have significant excess capacity as these technical centers were established and sized to support significantly higher naval force

levels and require resource levels greatly in excess of those projected if all resources are to be fully employed. Given this excess capacity and the imbalance with force and resource levels, it is imperative to realign and compress wherever possible so that the remaining technical centers will have the greater military value to the Department of the Navy. The Department of the Navy will dispose of this property and any proceeds will be used to defray base closure expenses.

#### COMMUNITY CONCERNS

There were no formal expressions from the community.

#### COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found the required engineering service mission areas of NCEL can be performed at Construction Battalion Center (CBC) Port Hueneme, CA. The move achieved savings in facility operations costs and personnel reductions by using common support provided by CBC Port Hueneme and also provides a 32-acre waterfront property for reuse.

#### COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria, and therefore, the Commission recommends the following: Close Naval Civil Engineering Laboratory (NCEL), Port Hueneme, CA, and realign necessary functions, personnel, equipment, and support at the Construction Battalion Center, Port Hueneme, California.

#### Naval Electronic Centers

**Charleston, South Carolina;  
Portsmouth, Virginia; St. Inigoes,  
Maryland; and Washington, D.C.**

*Category: Technical Center*  
*Mission: In-Service Engineering*  
*One-time Cost: \$ 44.4 million*  
*Savings: 1994-99: \$ 32.3 million*  
*Annual: \$ 11.1 million*  
*Payback: 11 years*

#### SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close Naval Electronics Systems Engineering Center (NESEC) St. Inigoes, Maryland, disestablish NESEC Charleston, South Carolina and Naval Electronics Security Systems Engineering Center (NESSEC), Washington, DC. Consolidate the Centers into an East Coast NESEC at Portsmouth, Virginia. The ATC/ACLS facility at St. Inigoes and the Aegis Radio Room Laboratory will remain in place and will be transferred to Naval Air Systems Command.

#### SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

This recommendation was rejected by the 1991 DoD Base Closure and Realignment Commission. In doing so, the Commission stated that DoD had failed to explore other alternative sites and had failed to address asserted problems at Portsmouth with testing of radars and communication equipment. Several new factors contributed to the renewal of this recommendation.

The DoD Force Structure Plan shows a significant further decrease in force structure from that in 1991, giving rise to additional excess capacity. The facilities at St. Inigoes, Maryland, once NESEC St. Inigoes relocates to Portsmouth, would be available to support the major relocation to the Patuxent River complex of the Naval Air Systems Command and several of its subordinate organizations. This move results in both substantial organizational efficiencies and economies and is a significant element of the Navy's compliance with the DoD policy to move activities out of leased space in the National Capital Region (NCR) DoD owned facilities. The Portsmouth consolidation includes NESSEC Washington, DC, resulting in an additional relocation from leased space in the NCR into DoD owned facilities. The Portsmouth consolidation also achieves a major reduction in excess capacity for these activities and with this consolidation in Portsmouth, the Navy Management Support Office can be consolidated at this Center. Without the Portsmouth consolidation, the benefits resulting from the synergy of consolidating the three centers would not be realized, and the reduction in excess capacity would be adversely impacted.

The Portsmouth consolidation utilizes, as the magnet site for this consolidation, the installation with the highest military value of all activities in the cluster. A review of the certified data call responses indicates that one of the reasons for this military value rating is NESEC Portsmouth's current capability to perform a broad range of testing functions on a wide variety of communications and radar systems, including the Submarine Broadcast System, Relocatable Over-the-Horizon Radar, Tactical Secure Voice, and the AN/SLQ-32(V) 1/2/3/4/5. At its Fleet Engineering Support Center is a completely integrated shipboard communications system that contains a sample of every communications receiver, transmitter, data link and ancillary terminal hardware in the LF through UHF frequency range. The radar systems testing capability is enhanced by the AN/SSQ-74(V) Radar and Communications Signal Simulator with its associated antenna farm. These capabilities, particularly when joined with those of the other activities in this consolidation, gives the Navy a most formidable technical center which, because of the consolidation, will be able to function more economically and efficiently than these activities could if separate.

#### **COMMUNITY CONCERNS**

##### **CHARLESTON**

The community contended the closure of NESEC Charleston and other bases in Charleston would have a disastrous economic impact on the community. The Charleston area has already lost employment due to retrenchment at Naval Shipyard Charleston and expects further losses due to cutbacks at the Polaris Missile Facility, Atlantic (POMFLANT). The community emphasized the closure of the NESEC alone would result in the direct and indirect loss of 3,776 jobs, or 1.6% of employment base. All of the proposed base closures in the Charleston area would negatively impact approximately 15% of the employment base. It argued that statewide, South Carolina stood to be hit harder than any other state relative to its population. South Carolina would lose one-third of all military jobs and one-sixth of all the civilian positions in this round of base closures.

##### **PORTSMOUTH**

The community indicated electro-magnetic interference was not a problem. It claimed the NESEC needs to remain in the Norfolk area.

##### **ST. INIGOES**

The community contended the military value grade for Naval Electronics Systems Engineering Activity (NESEA) St. Inigoes was understated because of miscalculations in the technical, facilities, manpower and location categories. Also the community claimed they did not get credit for area quality of life capabilities and pointed out NESEA St. Inigoes had a unique combination of facilities suited to its mission that would not be available at Portsmouth. Accordingly, they asserted there would be a high loss of skilled personnel who would not relocate, resulting in a significantly reduced Navy capability. It also stated that concerns about the consolidation expressed by the 1991 Commission were not addressed by the Navy in 1993. The community also expressed concern about the sharply increased unemployment in St. Mary's County, Maryland, associated with the closure of NESEA, St. Inigoes that would take place if the NCR relocation does not backfill through the transfer of Naval Air System Command to NAS Patuxent River, MD.

##### **WASHINGTON**

There were not formal expressions from the community.

#### **COMMISSION FINDINGS**

The Commission fully supports the Navy's effort to consolidate the Naval Electronics Systems Engineering Centers and Activities. However, the Commission found that while NESEC Portsmouth is not responsible for electro-magnetic interference (EMI) problems, the EMI situation in Portsmouth is of sufficient concern that it should not be the East Coast Electronics Center. Furthermore, the cost of renovating and building facilities at St. Julien's Creek was found to be unacceptably high. The Commission found the most economical solution providing a relatively EMI free environment is the consolidation

of the NESECs and NESEA at Charleston, South Carolina. Finally the cumulative economic impact resulting from Commission recommendations to close multiple Charleston Naval facilities would be severe.

#### **COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION**

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criteria 1, 2, 5 and 6. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: Naval Electronics Systems Engineering Center (NESEC), Charleston remains open and becomes the new East Coast lead facility. The Commission provides for the retention of Charleston Naval Station and Naval Shipyard facilities that are deemed necessary to establish or support this East Coast NESEC. NESEC, Washington closes and moves to NESEC, Charleston. NESEC, Portsmouth closes and moves to NESEC, Charleston, except for a detachment of fewer than 60 people. NESEA, St. Inigoes closes and moves to NESEC, Charleston. Module Maintenance Facility moves from Charleston Naval Shipyard to NESEC Charleston. The ATC/ACLs facility, the Aegis Radio Room Laboratory, Identify Friend or Foe, Light Airborne Multipurpose System (LAMPS), and special warfare joint program support at St. Inigoes will remain in place and will be transferred to Naval Air Systems Command. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

#### **Navy Radio Transmission Facility Annapolis, Maryland**

*Category: Telecommunications Activity*  
*Mission: Naval Telecommunications*  
*One-time Cost: \$ -0.5 million (Savings)*  
*Savings: 1994-99: \$ 6.025 million*  
*Annual: \$ 137 thousand*  
*Payback: Immediate*

#### **SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION**

Disestablish the Navy Radio Transmission Facility (NRTF), Annapolis. The Navy shall retain the real property on which this facility resides.

#### **SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION**

This action is recommended to eliminate redundancy in geographic coverage in Naval telecommunications. Projected reductions contained in the DoD Force Structure Plan support a decrease in telecommunications capacity. South-Atlantic VLF communications coverage is duplicated by the NRTF Annapolis and NCTS Puerto Rico, and the Mid-Atlantic VLF by NRTF Annapolis and NRTF Cutler, Maine. Since both the Puerto Rico and the Maine facilities also are the sole coverage for another geographic area, and since NRTF Annapolis is not, it could be disestablished without eliminating coverage. The property on which this activity has been sited will be retained by the Navy to support educational requirements at the Naval Academy.

#### **COMMUNITY CONCERNS**

The community argued the NRTF Annapolis signal was more dependable than NRTF Cutler, Maine. The community believed the work of NRTF Annapolis could be done with substantially fewer people than are used presently creating a greater cost savings. This cost savings would allow the Navy to maintain the radio facility.

#### **COMMISSION FINDINGS**

The Commission found the transmission coverage of NRTF Annapolis created a redundancy in the area covered. The primary facility, NRTF Cutler, Maine, was essential to the geographic configuration of the Naval telecommunications mission. The Commission found NRTF Annapolis could be eliminated with no loss of transmission coverage. The retained land would be utilized by the U.S. Naval Academy to support educational requirements.

#### **COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION**

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: disestablish the Navy Radio Transmission Facility Annapolis, Maryland. The Navy shall retain the real property on which this facility resides.

## **Navy Radio Transmission Facility Driver, Virginia**

*Category: Telecommunications Activity*

*Mission: Naval Telecommunications*

*One-time Cost: \$478 thousand*

*Savings: 1994-99: \$9.821 million*

*Annual: \$2.06 million*

*Payback: Immediate*

### **SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION**

Close the Navy Radio Transmission Facility (NRTF), Driver.

### **SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION**

This closure is recommended to eliminate redundancy in geographic coverage in Naval telecommunications. Projected reductions contained in the DoD Force Structure Plan support a decrease in telecommunications capacity. Mid-Atlantic high frequency communications coverage is duplicated by NRTF Driver and NRTF Saddle Branch, Florida.

### **COMMUNITY CONCERNS**

There were no formal expressions from the community.

### **COMMISSION FINDINGS**

The Commission found the coverage provided by NRTF Driver was redundant to the coverage provided by NRTF Saddle Branch. The primary facility, NRTF Saddle Branch, was essential to the geographic configuration of the Naval telecommunications mission. The Commission found NRTF Driver could be eliminated without loss of transmission coverage.

### **COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION**

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: Close the Navy Radio Transmission Facility (NRTF), Driver, Virginia.

## **Technical Centers (NAVSEA)**

### **Naval Surface Warfare Center- Dahlgren, White Oak Detachment, White Oak, Maryland**

*Category: Technical Center*

*Mission: Research, Development, Testing,  
and Evaluation Support*

*One-time Cost: \$ 74.6 million*

*Savings: 1994-99: \$ -33.2 million (Cost)*

*Annual: \$ 21.9 million*

*Payback: 9 years*

### **SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION**

Disestablish the White Oak Detachment of the Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC), (Dahlgren), located at White Oak, Maryland. Relocate its functions, personnel, equipment and support to NSWC-Dahlgren, Virginia. The property and facilities at White Oak will be retained for use by the Navy so that it may, among other things, relocate the Naval Sea Systems (NAVSEA) Command from leased space in Arlington, Virginia.

### **SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION**

This technical center is recommended for closure because its capacity is excess to that required by the DoD Force Structure Plan. There is excess capacity in this category based on a comparison of budgeted workload during the period 1986-1995 and the FY 1995 budgeted workload. A review of the Navy budget displays a clear decline in the period 1995-1999. As the work declines, the excess capacity increases thereby requiring a reduction in facilities and personnel. The technical centers throughout the Department of the Navy currently have significant excess capacity as these technical centers were established and sized to support significantly higher naval force levels and require resource levels greatly in excess of those projected if all resources are to be fully employed. Given this excess capacity and the imbalance with force and resource levels, it is imperative to realign and compress wherever possible so that the remaining technical centers will have the greater military value to the Department of the Navy.

### COMMUNITY CONCERNS

There were no formal expressions from the community.

### COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found the consolidation of personnel and functions contained in this recommendation makes sense from an operational perspective. The Commission also found the driving factor behind this planned action is not predicated upon, nor dependent upon, other actions within the National Capital Region.

The Secretary suggested a revision to his March 1993 recommendation. The Commission found that the revised proposal had a higher military value and should be adopted.

### COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from the force structure and final criterion 1. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: disestablish the White Oak Detachment of the Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC), (Dahlgren), located at White Oak, MD. Relocate its functions, personnel, equipment, and support to NSWC-Dahlgren, VA, NSWC-Indian Head, Indian Head, MD, and NSWC-Dahlgren, Coastal Systems Station, Panama City, FL. The property and facilities at White Oak will be retained for use by the Navy so that it may, among other things, relocate the Naval Sea Systems (NAVSEA) Command from leased space in Arlington, VA. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

### Naval Surface Warfare Center— Carderock, Annapolis Detachment, Annapolis, Maryland

*Category: Technical Center*  
*Mission: Research, Development, Testing,  
And Evaluation Support*

*One-time Cost: N/A*

*Savings: N/A*

*Annual: N/A*

*Payback: N/A*

### SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Disestablish the Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC)-Carderock, Annapolis Detachment, Annapolis, Maryland, and relocate the necessary functions, personnel, equipment and support to the Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC)-Carderock, Philadelphia Detachment, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and NSWC-Carderock, Bethesda, Maryland.

### SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

This technical center is recommended for disestablishment because its capacity is excess to that required by the DoD Force Structure Plan. There is excess capacity in this category based on a comparison of budgeted workload during the period 1986-1995 and the FY 1995 budgeted workload. A review of the Navy budget displays a clear decline in the period 1995-1999. Thus, as the work declines, the excess capacity increases thereby requiring a reduction in facilities and personnel. The technical centers throughout the Department of the Navy currently have significant excess capacity as these technical centers were established and sized to support significantly higher naval force levels and require resource levels greatly in excess of those projected if all resources are to be fully employed. Given this excess capacity and the imbalance with force and resource levels, it is imperative to realign and compress wherever possible so that the remaining technical centers will have the greater military value to the Department of the Navy.

### COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The Annapolis community stressed in 1991 the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission found NSWC Annapolis essential to current and future mission requirements. The community noted the site facilities were acknowledged to be superior by the 1991 Commission. The community also highlighted the high retention rates among an extremely educated and experienced staff. It also emphasized the Navy's analysis of excess capacity was global and not specific to the work done at NSWC Annapolis. The community maintained the

services provided by NSWC Annapolis were essential regardless of downsizing, and it would be expensive and time-consuming to replicate the facility's services elsewhere. The community also objected to the Navy's plan to implement this realignment proposal since it would require engineers to commute to Annapolis, Maryland, from their new offices in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and Bethesda, Maryland in order to conduct routine on-going research and development.

#### COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found the DoD recommendation overstated the potential savings from the proposed action by not taking into account added costs and inefficiencies, resulting from having engineering personnel separated from their test facility. Additionally, one of the primary motives of this recommendation appears to be reduction in personnel.

#### COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criteria 4 and 5 and, therefore, adopts the following recommendation: the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Annapolis, MD, remains open and is not disestablished. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

#### **Naval Surface Warfare Center— Port Hueneme, Virginia Beach Detachment, Virginia Beach, Virginia**

*Category: Technical Center*

*Mission: Technical Support of Shipboard Systems*

*One-time Cost: \$ 2.0 million*

*Savings: 1994-99: \$ 8.1 million*

*Annual: \$ 6.9 million*

*Payback: 3 years*

#### **SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION**

Disestablish the Virginia-Beach Detachment of the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme and relocate its functions, personnel, equipment and support to the Fleet Combat Training Center, Dam Neck, Virginia.

#### **SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION**

This technical center is recommended for disestablishment because its capacity is excess to that required by the DoD Force Structure Plan. There is excess capacity in this category based on a comparison of budgeted workload during the period 1986-1995 and the FY 1995 budgeted workload. A review of the Navy budget displays a clear decline in the period 1995-1999. As the work declines, the excess capacity increases thereby requiring a reduction in facilities and personnel. The technical centers throughout the Department of the Navy currently have significant excess capacity as these technical centers were established and sized to support significantly higher naval force levels and require resource levels greatly in excess of those projected if all resources are to be fully employed. Given this excess capacity and the imbalance with force and resource levels, it is imperative to realign and compress wherever possible so that the remaining technical centers will have the greater military value to the Department of the Navy.

#### **COMMUNITY CONCERNS**

The community argued relocating the Virginia Beach Detachment of the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme, to the Fleet Combat Training Center, Dam Neck, Virginia, would destroy in-service engineering workload synergies created by the 1991 Defense Base Closure's realignment of the Virginia Beach Detachment of the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme, to FCDSSA Dam Neck. Further, the community pointed out the irrationality of moving the Virginia Beach Detachment of the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme, away from a similar in-service engineering function to the Fleet Combat Training Center Atlantic, Dam Neck, Virginia, which is a training function.

The community also contended the 1993 Defense Base Closure Commission's estimated savings reflect planned personnel reductions, not reductions in overhead costs.

#### **COMMISSION FINDINGS**

The Commission found the proposed disestablishment involved a minimal physical relocation. The proposed move to a larger base

would allow the Navy to gain some operational efficiencies not otherwise achievable.

#### **COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION**

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria, and therefore the Commission adopts the following recommendation of the Secretary of Defense: disestablish the Virginia Beach Detachment of the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme, and relocate its functions, personnel, equipment, and support to the Fleet Combat Training Center, Dam Neck, Virginia.

#### **Naval Undersea Warfare Center— Norfolk Detachment, Norfolk, Virginia**

*Category: Technical Center*

*Mission: In-service engineering in support  
of underwater vehicles*

*One-time Cost: \$ 18.0 million*

*Savings: 1994-99: \$ 6.0 million*

*Annual: \$ 5.0 million*

*Payback: 6 years*

#### **SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION**

Disestablish the Norfolk Detachment of the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Newport, Rhode Island, and relocate its functions, personnel, equipment and support to the Naval Undersea Warfare Center (NUWC), Newport, Rhode Island.

#### **SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION**

This technical center is recommended for closure because its capacity is excess to that required by the approved DoD Force Structure Plan. There is excess capacity in this category based on a comparison of budgeted workload during the period 1986-1995 and the FY 1995 budgeted workload. A review of the Navy budget displays a clear decline in the period 1995-1999. Thus, as the work declines, the excess capacity increases thereby requiring a reduction in facilities and personnel. The technical centers throughout the Department of the Navy currently have significant excess capacity as these technical centers were established and sized to support significantly higher naval force levels

and require resource levels greatly in excess of those projected if all resources are to be fully employed. Given this excess capacity and the imbalance with force and resource levels, it is imperative to realign and compress wherever possible so that the remaining technical centers will have the greater military value to the Department of the Navy.

#### **COMMUNITY CONCERNS**

The community believed the Navy understated the Warfare Center's military value ranking by not fully considering the installation's wide range of engineering and logistics services. The community stated in-service engineering facilities should be located near fleet customers to be responsive. By moving the Center's activities to Newport, Rhode Island, the Navy would be moving those services farther away from the customers.

#### **COMMISSION FINDINGS**

The Commission found the Navy had understated the costs associated with the proposed closure of NUWC Norfolk in two areas. First, transportation costs associated with the proposed relocation of activities had been underestimated. Second, the cost to the Navy of getting out of its current lease in Norfolk had not been adequately stated. The Commission also found the activities in Newport and Norfolk were organizationally linked, and increased efficiencies and synergy would be gained from their collocation. This increase in the operational functioning of the combined organization outweighs the costs associated with the closure of the Norfolk facility, and the resulting relocation to Newport.

#### **COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION**

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force structure plan and final criteria and, therefore, the Commission adopts the following recommendation of the Secretary of Defense: disestablish the Norfolk Detachment of the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Newport, Rhode Island, and relocate its functions, personnel, equipment and support to the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Newport, Rhode Island.

## Planning, Engineering for Repair and Alteration Centers (PERA)

*Category: Technical Centers*

*Mission: Ship Repair Planning*

*PERA (CV)*

*One-time Cost: \$ 6.3 million*

*Savings: 1994-99: \$ -4.46 million (Cost)*

*Annual: \$ 0.74 million*

*Payback: 17 years*

*PERA (All others combined)*

*One-time Cost: \$ 8.9 million*

*Savings: \$ 1.2 million*

*Annual: \$ 2.3 million*

*Payback: 7 years*

### SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Disestablish the following four technical centers and relocate necessary functions, personnel, equipment, and support at the Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair, San Diego, California, Portsmouth, Virginia and Newport News, Virginia:

- (PERA)-(CV), Bremerton, Washington,
- (PERA)-(Surface) Atlantic, Norfolk, Virginia,
- (PERA)-(Surface) Pacific, San Francisco, California,
- (PERA)-(Surface) (HQ), Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

### SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

These technical centers are recommended for disestablishment because their capacity is excess to that required by the DoD Force Structure Plan. There is excess capacity in this category based on a comparison of budgeted workload during the period 1986-1995 and the FY 1995 budgeted workload. A review of the Navy budget displays a clear decline in the period 1995-1999. Thus, as the work declines, the excess capacity increases thereby requiring a reduction in facilities and personnel. The technical centers throughout the Department of the Navy currently have significant excess capacity as these technical centers were established and sized to support significantly higher naval force levels and require resource levels greatly in excess of those projected if all resources are to

be fully employed. Given this excess capacity and the imbalance with force and resource levels, it is imperative to realign and compress wherever possible so that the remaining technical centers will have the greater military value to the Department of the Navy.

### COMMUNITY CONCERNS

*(PERA Surface, Philadelphia)*

The community stated the Navy's study of PERA Philadelphia was fundamentally flawed because the community alleged the Navy did not use certified data. Furthermore, the community claimed the Navy's proposal could not realize real savings in either personnel or monetary terms because the projected elimination of positions could not actually occur. The community also stated the Navy did not consider an alternative proposal from the community that would save \$16 million.

*(PERA CV, Bremerton)*

The community stated the mission of PERA (CV) was substantially different from both PERA (Surface) and Supervisor of Shipbuilding. It noted the move of PERA (CV) would not break-even for seventeen years—the longest break-even period of any naval activity recommended for closure or realignment.

### COMMISSION FINDINGS

In the case of PERA (HQ) Philadelphia, the Commission found the Navy's recommendation was based on certified data, and the personnel reductions proposed by the Navy were reasonable. The consolidation proposed for the PERA centers allows for efficiencies of collocation.

### COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: disestablish the following four technical centers and relocate necessary functions, personnel, equipment, and support at the Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair, San Diego, California, Portsmouth, Virginia and Newport News, Virginia:

(PERA)-(CV), Bremerton, Washington,  
(PERA)-(Surface) Atlantic, Norfolk,  
Virginia,  
(PERA)-(Surface) Pacific, San Francisco,  
California,  
(PERA)-(Surface) (HQ), Philadelphia,  
Pennsylvania.

### **Sea Automated Data Systems Activity Indian Head, Maryland**

*Category: Technical Center*  
*Mission: Data Automation Support*  
*One-time Cost: \$ -0.1 million (Savings)*  
*Savings: 1994-99: \$ 0.1 million*  
*Annual: \$ 0.5 million*  
*Payback: 6 years*

#### **SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION**

Disestablish the Sea Automated Data Systems Activity (SEAADSA) and relocate necessary functions, personnel, equipment, and support at Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC) Indian Head, Maryland.

#### **SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION**

This technical center is recommended for disestablishment because its capacity is excess to that required by the DoD Force-Structure Plan. There is excess capacity in this category based on a comparison of budgeted workload during the period 1986-1995 and the FY 1995 budget workload. A review of the Navy budget displays a clear decline in the period 1995-1999. Thus, as the work declines, the excess capacity increases thereby requiring a reduction in facilities and personnel. The technical centers throughout the Department of the Navy currently have significant excess capacity as these technical centers were established and sized to support significantly higher naval force levels and require resource levels greatly in excess of those projected if all resources are to be fully employed. Given this excess capacity and the imbalance with force and resource levels, it is imperative to realign and compress wherever possible so that the remaining technical centers will have the greater military value to the Department of the Navy.

#### **COMMUNITY CONCERNS**

There were no formal expressions from the community.

#### **COMMISSION FINDINGS**

The Commission found there was excess capacity in the Technical Center base category. Considering the need to realign and consolidate these facilities wherever possible, and considering the feasibility of consolidating this facility in particular, the Commission found it was in the best interests of the Navy to disestablish SEAADSA Indian Head, MD. The proposed action is primarily organizational. The one-time costs of the proposed action are negligible, and the disestablishment of SEAADSA pays for itself almost immediately.

#### **COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION**

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission adopts the following recommendation of the Secretary of Defense: Disestablish the Sea Automated Data Systems Activity (SEAADSA) and relocate necessary functions, personnel, equipment, and support at Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC), Indian Head, Maryland.

### **Submarine Maintenance, Engineering, Planning and Procurement, Portsmouth, New Hampshire**

*Category: Technical Center*  
*Mission: Ship Repair Planning*  
*One-time Cost: \$ 1.2 million*  
*Savings: 1994-99: \$ 8.7 million*  
*Annual: \$ 2.6 million*  
*Payback: 3 years*

#### **SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION**

Disestablish the Submarine Maintenance, Engineering, Planning and Procurement (SUBMEPP), New Hampshire, and relocate the necessary functions, personnel, equipment, and support at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, Kittery, Maine.

## SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

This technical center is recommended for disestablishment because its capacity is excess to that required by the DoD Force Structure Plan. There is excess capacity in this category based on a comparison of budgeted workload during the period 1986-1995 and the FY 1995 budget workload. A review of the Navy budget displays a clear decline in the period 1995-1999. Thus, as the work declines, the excess capacity increases thereby requiring a reduction in facilities and personnel. The technical centers throughout the Department of the Navy currently have significant excess capacity as these technical centers were established and sized to support significantly higher naval force levels and require resource levels greatly in excess of those projected if all resources are to be fully employed. Given this excess capacity and the imbalance with force and resource levels, it is imperative to realign and compress wherever possible so that the remaining technical centers will have the greater military value to the Department of the Navy.

## COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The employees expressed concern that, as a part of the shipyard, SUBMEPP might be forced to raise their man-day rate, thereby decreasing their ability to serve the fleet. It also noted they are expected to represent the customers of the shipyard, and might not be viewed as an honest broker if not established as a tenant command of the shipyard.

## COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found the Navy decision was based on sound data. Once moved to the shipyard, the former SUBMEPP would remain under the jurisdiction of the Naval Sea Systems Command, which could determine the most effective management organization.

## COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following:

disestablish the Submarine Maintenance, Engineering, Planning and Procurement (SUBMEPP), New Hampshire, and relocate the necessary functions, personnel, equipment, and support at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, Kittery, Maine.

## Naval Supply Centers

### Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (Naval Supply Center) Charleston, South Carolina

*Category: Supply Center*

*Mission: Supply Support*

*One-time Cost: \$ 9 million*

*Savings: 1994-99: \$ 23.2 million*

*Annual: \$ 10.6 million*

*Payback: Immediate*

## SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Disestablish the Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (Naval Supply Center) Charleston.

## SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (Naval Supply Center) Charleston's capacity is excess to the requirements of the DoD Force Structure Plan. The principal customers of Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (Naval Supply Center) Charleston, the Charleston Naval Shipyard and the Naval Station Charleston, have been recommended for closure. The workload of Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (Naval Supply Center) Charleston will move with its customer's workload to receiving bases.

## COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The Charleston community asserted a large number of people will still be needed to support contracting throughout the Southeast as well as various supply functions in the Charleston area. The community also pointed out that the retention of the quality jobs at FISC Charleston would help to mitigate the cumulative economic impact of the recommended closure of multiple activities in the Charleston area. The community further emphasized the cumulative economic impact on Charleston will be even greater when combined with the significant drawdowns that have already occurred since 1989.

The community viewed the amount of shipping required to move materials to Norfolk as unrealistically low. The community also suggested that Cheatham Annex be closed instead of the Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (Naval Supply Center), Charleston because it had a lower military value.

#### **COMMISSION FINDINGS**

The Commission found that despite the closure of Charleston's Shipyard and Naval Station, there still remains sufficient workload to justify the existence of a supply presence in the Charleston area, in the form of a downsized FISC to support Navy requirements in the region now served by FISC Charleston. FISC Charleston has been the major contracting office for Navy and other Government agencies in the Southeastern United States and has an expertise in this area which could be retained in the downsized FISC. The total closure of FISC Charleston would leave that area, including the Weapons Station and the Naval Electronics Systems Engineering Center, without contract and supply support that FISC did provide.

#### **COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION**

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criterion 1. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: partially disestablish Naval Supply Center (NSC) Charleston, South Carolina, and retain the facilities and personnel appropriate for the continued support of Navy activities in the Charleston, South Carolina area. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

#### **Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (Naval Supply Center) Oakland, California**

*Category: Supply Center*

*Mission: Supply Support*

*One-time Cost: N/A*

*Savings: N/A*

*Annual: N/A*

*Payback: N/A*

#### **SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION**

Close the Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (Naval Supply Center) Oakland, including the Naval Supply Depot, Point Molate, and relocate two supply ships to the Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (Naval Supply Center), San Diego. The Office of the Military Sealift Command, Pacific Division, relocates to leased space in the Oakland area.

#### **SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION**

Fleet and Industrial Supply Center's (Naval Supply Center), Oakland, capacity is excess to the requirements of the DoD Force Structure Plan. The principal customers of Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (Naval Supply Center) Oakland; Naval Aviation Depot, Alameda; Naval Hospital, Oakland; Mare Island Naval Shipyard and Naval Station Treasure Island have also been recommended for closure. The workload of Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (Naval Supply Center) Oakland will move with its customers to other locations.

#### **COMMUNITY CONCERNS**

The Oakland community argued the Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (Naval Supply Center), Oakland, is located at a major transportation hub on the west coast that uniquely offers access to air, rail, land, and sea transportation ports.

The community added the Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (Naval Supply Center), Oakland, has legal authority to negotiate a lease with the Port of Oakland for the port to construct a new container facility on Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (Naval Supply Center), Oakland, property. It pointed out the lease payments would support Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (Naval Supply Center) operations and the Navy still has reversion rights in contingency situations, which are statutorily protected.

The Oakland community argued the Oakland Fleet and Industrial Supply Center's (Naval Supply Center) major customers were not local. The center's major customers were the ships located throughout the Western Pacific commands.

The community further argued the Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (Naval Supply Center), Oakland, also acted as a naval station and was the primary berthing site for ships officially homeported at Naval Weapons Station, Concord, CA. In addition, Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (Naval Supply Center), Oakland, had many tenants and not all costs were identified to relocate these tenants.

#### COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found the Secretary of Defense based his recommendation to close the Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (Naval Supply Center), Oakland on the excess capacity found in the overall capability at the Fleet and Industrial Supply Centers.

The primary customers of the Center are not local. The ships and shore commands found in the Mid- and Western Pacific rely extensively on FISC Oakland for supply support. While many of the Center's local customers are being closed, this workload is only a small part of the business base, thus justifying retention of FISC Oakland.

The Commission found the Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (Naval Supply Center), Oakland was ideally located on the west coast in a major transportation hub offering major access to air, rail, land, and sea transportation ports which greatly enhances its military value.

The Commission also found that the quality, and often minority, jobs retained at FISC Oakland helped to mitigate the cumulative economic impacts of other Bay Area commands recommended for closure.

#### COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from criteria 1, 3 and 6. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: Naval Supply Center (NSC) Oakland, California, remains open. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

### Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (Naval Supply Center) Pensacola, Florida

*Category: Supply Center*

*Mission: Logistics Support for the Naval Aviation Depot Pensacola*

*One-time Cost: \$7.9 million*

*Savings: 1994-99: \$29.06 million*

*Annual: \$ 6.7 million*

*Payback: 0 years*

#### SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Disestablish the Naval Supply Center (NSC) Pensacola.

#### SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

NSC Pensacola's capacity is excess to the requirements of the DoD Force Structure Plan. The principal customer of NSC Pensacola, the Naval Aviation Depot, Pensacola, is also recommended for closure. The workload of NSC Pensacola will move with its customers' workload to receiving bases.

#### COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community stated that personnel from the local commands' supply departments were transferred to what is now Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (Naval Supply Center), Pensacola, in order to partially staff that organization. Therefore, savings would be substantially less than perceived by the Navy, even if NADEP Pensacola were closed because the remaining activities could require the logistics support of the Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (Naval Supply Center). It was also a concern of the community if NADEP Pensacola remained open, all supply support for this activity would have to come from NADEP Jacksonville, which it perceives to be inadequate support.

#### COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found the Fleet and Industrial Supply Center's (Naval Supply Center) primary customer at Pensacola is the Naval Aviation

Depot. The Commission found that since the Naval Aviation Depot is recommended by the Commission for closure, the workload requirement would diminish significantly and excess capacity would result.

#### COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: disestablish the Naval Supply Center (NSC), Pensacola.

#### *National Capital Regional (NCR) Activities*

#### **National Capital Regional (NCR) Activities**

*Category: National Capital Region*

*Mission: Personnel*

*One-time Cost: \$ 427 million*

*Savings: 1994-99: \$ -66 million (Cost)*

*Annual: \$ 110 million*

*Payback: 2-14 years*

#### SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Realign Navy National Capital Region activities and relocate them as follows:

Naval Air Systems Command  
to Naval Air Station  
Patuxent River, Maryland

Naval Supply Systems Command  
(Including Food Service System  
Office, and Defense Printing  
Management Systems Office)  
to Ship Parts Control Center  
Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania

Bureau of Naval Personnel  
(Including Office of Military  
Manpower Management) to  
Naval Air Station  
Memphis, Tennessee

Naval Recruiting Command  
to Naval Training Center  
Great Lakes, Illinois

Naval Security Group Command  
(Including Security Group Station  
and Security Group Detachment,  
Potomac) to National Security Agency  
Fort Meade, Maryland

Tactical Support Office to  
Commander-in-Chief  
Atlantic Fleet  
Norfolk, Virginia

Relocate the following National Capital Region activities from leased space to Government-owned space within the NCR, to include the Navy Annex, Arlington, Virginia; Washington Navy Yard, Washington, D.C.; 3801 Nebraska Avenue, Washington, D.C.; Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Virginia; or the White Oak facility, Silver Spring, Maryland:

Naval Sea Systems Command  
Naval Facilities Engineering Command  
Space and Naval Warfare Systems  
Command

Office of the General Counsel  
Office of the Judge Advocate General  
Navy Field Support Activity  
Office of the Secretary of the Navy

- Legislative Affairs
- Program Appraisal
- Comptroller
- Inspector General
- Information

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations  
Office of Civilian Manpower Management  
International Programs Office  
Combined Civilian Personnel Office  
Navy Regional Contracting Center  
Naval Criminal Investigative Service  
Naval Audit Service  
Strategic Systems Programs Office  
Office of Naval Research  
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff  
(Installations & Logistics),  
U.S. Marine Corps  
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff  
(Manpower & Reserve Affairs),  
U.S. Marine Corps  
Marine Corps Systems Command  
(Clarendon Office)

## COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The State of Virginia, and Arlington County in particular, argued they would suffer an unfair and disproportionate share of job losses from the recommended NCR actions. The community also challenged the COBRA cost savings estimated for these recommendations. It asserted the military construction (MILCON) and travel costs were understated at receiver locations, present and future lease costs for current office space were overstated, and the elimination of personnel associated with these realignments and relocations relied on unsubstantiated expectations. Further, the community asserted all required personnel reductions could be made in place.

## COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found cost savings produced through realigning NCR activities were substantial. The Commission found significant military value in the consolidation of NCR missions at receiver locations. With respect to various unsolicited and revocable lease and sale offers for buildings in Northern Virginia presently occupied by Navy tenants, the Commission did not have the information or expertise to evaluate properly whether the "offers" provided the best value to the government or if they met the Navy's requirements. Moreover, the Commission was not the appropriate entity to accept or reject the proposals. If, after careful scrutiny of these or other proposals, the Navy wishes to seek purchase of these or any facilities, it can submit a recommended change concerning these NCR activities to the 1995 Commission.

## COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission found the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following:

Realign Navy National Capital Region activities and relocate them as follows:

Naval Air Systems Command to  
Naval Air Station  
Patuxent River, Maryland

Naval Supply Systems Command  
(Including Food Service System  
Office, and Defense Printing  
Management Systems Office)  
to Ship Parts Control Center  
Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania

Bureau of Naval Personnel  
(Including Office of Military  
Manpower Management) to  
Naval Air Station  
Memphis, Tennessee

Naval Recruiting Command  
to Naval Training Center  
Great Lakes, Illinois

Naval Security Group Command  
(Including Security Group Station  
and Security Group Detachment,  
Potomac) to National Security Agency  
Fort Meade, Maryland

Tactical Support Office  
to Commander-in-Chief  
Atlantic Fleet  
Norfolk, Virginia

Relocate the following National Capital Region activities from leased space to Government-owned space within the NCR, to include the Navy Annex, Arlington, Virginia; Washington Navy Yard, Washington, D.C.; 3801 Nebraska Avenue, Washington, D.C.; Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Virginia; or the White Oak facility, Silver Spring, Maryland:

Naval Sea Systems Command  
Naval Facilities Engineering Command  
Space and Naval Warfare Systems  
Command

Office of the General Counsel  
Office of the Judge Advocate General  
Navy Field Support Activity  
Office of the Secretary of the Navy

- Legislative Affairs
- Program Appraisal
- Comptroller
- Inspector General
- Information

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations  
Office of Civilian Manpower Management  
International Programs Office  
Combined Civilian Personnel Office  
Navy Regional Contracting Center  
Naval Criminal Investigative Service  
Naval Audit Service  
Strategic Systems Programs Office  
Office of Naval Research  
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff  
(Installations & Logistics),  
U.S. Marine Corps  
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff  
(Manpower & Reserve Affairs),  
U.S. Marine Corps  
Marine Corps Systems Command  
(Clarendon Office)

### **Other Naval Bases**

#### **1st Marine Corps District Garden City, New York**

*Category: Administrative Activity*

*Mission: Recruiting Support*

*One-time Cost: \$ N/A*

*Savings: 1994-99: \$ N/A*

*Annual: \$ N/A*

*Payback: N/A*

#### **SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION**

Close the 1st Marine District, Garden City, New York and relocate necessary personnel, equipment and support to the Defense Distribution Region East, New Cumberland, Pennsylvania. The Defense Contract Management Area Office, a present tenant in the facility occupied by this activity as its host, will remain in place and assume responsibility for this facility. The Marine Corps Reserve Center, Garden City will relocate to Fort Hamilton, New York.

#### **SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION**

The reductions in force structure require a reduction of capacity in administrative activities. Consolidation of this activity into a joint services organization will enhance its ability to discharge its mission most effectively and economically.

#### **COMMUNITY CONCERNS**

The community opposed the relocation of the First Marine Corps District to New Cumberland, Pennsylvania. Citing the long history of Marine service in Garden City, the community asserted the Marines were an integral part of the community. The Marine Corps supported relocation of this recruiting support activity to Pennsylvania to locate it more centrally within the nine-state area it services. However, relocation of the Marine Corps Reserve Activity to Fort Hamilton, Brooklyn, New York, would not be cost effective since Fort Hamilton does not have adequate facilities. The community suggested an alternative to collocate with an existing reserve facility within a reasonable commuting distance from Garden City, or become a tenant of the Defense Contract Management Area Office.

#### **COMMISSION FINDINGS**

The Commission found military construction would be required at Fort Hamilton, New York, to accommodate the relocation of the Marine Corps Reserve Center. The Commission found this additional military construction was neither cost effective nor necessary from a military perspective.

#### **COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION**

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criterion 4. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: the 1st Marine Corps District, Garden City, New York, will remain open. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

#### **DoD Family Housing and Family Housing Office, Niagara Falls, New York**

*Category: Miscellaneous Other Support Activities*

*Mission: To provide housing for military personnel*

*One-time Cost: \$ .1 million*

*Savings: 1994-99: \$ 7.9 million*

*Annual: \$ 1.5 million*

*Payback: Immediate*

### SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close the DoD Family Housing Office and the 111 housing units it administers.

### SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

The force reductions in the DOD Force Structure Plan require reduction of support activities as well. This activity administers housing units which are old and substandard and expensive to maintain. These housing units are occupied by military personnel performing recruiting duties in the local area. The number of recruiting personnel will be drawing down, and those that remain will be able to find adequate housing on the local economy.

### COMMUNITY CONCERNS

There were no formal expressions from the community.

### COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found these 111 substandard units provide housing for about one-third of the military assigned independent duty in western New York State. This activity services 18 small commands in an area where affordable housing is available in the local economy. Repair costs to bring these structures up to standards would not be economical.

### COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close the DoD Family Housing Office and the 111 housing units it administers.

### Naval Facilities Engineering Command Western Engineering Field Division San Bruno, California

*Category: Naval Facilities Engineering Command*

*Mission: Facility Engineering Support*

*One-time Cost: \$ .8 million*

*Savings: 1994-99 \$ .2 million*

*Annual: \$ 1.3 million*

*Payback: 6 years*

### SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Realign the Western Engineering Field Division, Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC), San Bruno, California. Retain in place necessary personnel, equipment and support as a Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Engineering Field Activity under the management of the Southwestern Field Division, NAVFAC, San Diego, California.

### SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

The reduction in the force structure in the DoD Force Structure Plan and the closure of major naval activities in the San Francisco Bay area requires the realignment of this activity. The activity's capacity to handle NAVFAC's considerable responsibilities in dealing with environmental matters arising out of the 1993 round of base closures will remain in the same geographic area. The activity presently has such capacity. Retaining it for this purpose is a more economical and efficient alternative than relocating it to San Diego and then handling on-site problems on a travel status.

### COMMUNITY CONCERNS

There were no formal expressions from the community.

### COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found the Western Engineering Field Division provides support to commands in the San Francisco Bay area recommended by the Commission for closure. Retaining a portion of the organization to provide environmental services during the closure process would facilitate the provision of these important services to those naval activities.

### COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: realign the Western Engineering Field Division, Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC), San Bruno, California. Retain in place necessary personnel, equipment and support as a Base

Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Engineering Field Activity under the management of the Southwestern Field Division, NAVFAC, San Diego, California.

### **Navy Public Works Center, San Francisco, California**

*Category: Public Works Center*  
*Mission: Public Works Support*  
*One-time Cost: \$37.5 million*  
*Savings: 1994-99 \$ 25.7 million*  
*Annual: \$ 33.9 million*  
*Payback: 2 years*

#### **SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION**

Disestablish the Public Works Center (PWC) San Francisco.

#### **SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION**

PWC San Francisco's capacity is excess to that required by the DoD Force Structure Plan, and due to other Navy closures and realignments, its principal customer base has been eliminated.

#### **COMMUNITY CONCERNS**

The community claimed the Naval Public Works Center in San Francisco provided a greater number of family housing units than any other Navy location. The Navy Public Works Center operates over 7,000 family housing units in the Bay area, many of which were new.

#### **COMMISSION FINDINGS**

The Commission found PWC San Francisco provides family housing, utilities, transportation, maintenance, engineering, and planning services to Navy, Marine Corps, Army, Coast Guard, and DOD commands in the San Francisco Bay Area. Because its primary customers in the Bay area are being recommended for closure, PWC San Francisco can also be closed and the customers that remain can receive the necessary services, including family housing, from reconstituted public works departments.

#### **COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION**

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore,

the Commission recommends the following: disestablish the Public Works Center (PWC) San Francisco.

### **Reserve Activities**

#### **Navy/Marine Corps Reserve Centers**

*Category: Reserve Centers*  
*Mission: Support Reserve Activities*  
*One-time Cost: \$ 3.2 million*  
*Savings: 1994-99: \$ 57.1 million*  
*Annual: \$ 13.6 million*  
*Payback: N/A*

#### **SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION**

Close the following Reserve Centers:

Navy/Marine Corps Reserve Centers at:

Fort Wayne, Indiana  
Billings, Montana  
Abilene, Texas

Naval Reserve Centers at:

Gadsden, Alabama  
Montgomery, Alabama  
Fayetteville, Arkansas  
Fort Smith, Arkansas  
Pacific Grove, California  
Macon, Georgia  
Terre Haute, Indiana  
Hutchinson, Kansas  
Monroe, Louisiana  
New Bedford, Massachusetts  
Pittsfield, Massachusetts  
Joplin, Missouri  
St. Joseph, Missouri  
Great Falls, Montana  
Missoula, Montana  
Atlantic City, New Jersey  
Perth Amboy, New Jersey  
Jamestown, New York  
Poughkeepsie, New York  
Altoona, Pennsylvania  
Kingsport, Tennessee  
Memphis, Tennessee  
Ogden, Utah  
Staunton, Virginia  
Parkersburg, West Virginia

Naval Reserve Facility at:

Alexandria, Louisiana  
Midland, Texas

Readiness Command Districts at:  
 Olathe, Kansas (REDCOM 18)  
 Scotia, New York (REDCOM 2)  
 Ravenna, Ohio (REDCOM 5)

### SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

The DOD Force Structure Plan requires the reduction of reserve assets as it does active duty assets. These Reserve Centers are being closed because their capacity is excess to the projected Navy/Marine Corps requirements. In arriving at the recommendation to close the Reserve Centers, specific analysis was conducted to ensure that there was either an alternate location available to accommodate the affected reserve population (e.g., realign with an existing reserve center), or demographic support for purposes of force recruiting in the areas to which units were being relocated. This specific analysis, conducted through the COBRA model, supports these closures.

### COMMUNITY CONCERNS

Various communities expressed concerns about these closures since no provision appeared to have made to allow for reservists assigned to continue to drill. The communities indicated these activities were below threshold, and closure would result in reservists having nowhere within a reasonable commuting distance to drill. The communities also argued the Navy should have explored consolidation possibilities at some of these sites rather than closures.

### COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found that while data calls did not directly assess the mission of these activities, the analysis was nevertheless consistent. When recurring logistics costs for reservists who commute outside a reasonable distance to drill were included in the COBRA, it produced no significant change in return on investment. A Reserve Force comprehensive facilities review with projected repair costs, supported the Secretary's recommendation; even though it did not address specific shortfalls in space requirements for vehicles, controlled equipment, trainers, and other special use spaces. A nation-wide scatter diagram of reserve drill population by

activity preserved a surface reserve presence in all geographic locations of the nation. The proposal minimized disruption in reserve training, and contributory support to the active components, while producing cost efficiencies and enhancing the overall military value of remaining reserve centers.

However, the Commission found variance in the case of Naval and Marine Corps Reserve Center, Billings, Montana. The Marine Corps Reserve indicated it would not be able to man its units if they were forced to compete for recruits at the Armed Forces Reserve Center in Helena where the Navy is consolidating its reserves.

### COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from criterion 4. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close the following Reserve Centers:

Navy/Marine Corps Reserve Centers at:  
 Fort Wayne, Indiana  
 Abilene, Texas

Naval Reserve Centers at:  
 Gadsden, Alabama  
 Montgomery, Alabama  
 Fayetteville, Arkansas  
 Fort Smith, Arkansas  
 Pacific Grove, California  
 Macon, Georgia  
 Terre Haute, Indiana  
 Hutchinson, Kansas  
 Monroe, Louisiana  
 New Bedford, Massachusetts  
 Pittsfield, Massachusetts  
 Joplin, Missouri  
 St Joseph, Missouri  
 Great Falls, Montana  
 Missoula, Montana  
 Atlantic City, New Jersey  
 Perth Amboy, New Jersey  
 Jamestown, New York  
 Poughkeepsie, New York  
 Altoona, Pennsylvania  
 Kingsport, Tennessee  
 Memphis, Tennessee  
 Ogden, Utah  
 Staunton, Virginia  
 Parkersburg, West Virginia

Naval Reserve Facilities at:  
Alexandria, Louisiana  
Midland, Texas

Readiness Command Districts at:  
Olathe, Kansas (REDCOM 18)  
Scotia, New York (REDCOM 2)  
Ravenna, Ohio (REDCOM 5)

The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

### ***Navy/Marine Corps Reserve Centers***

#### **Navy and Marine Corps Reserve Center at Lawrence, Massachusetts Naval Reserve Center at Chicopee, Massachusetts and Quincy, Massachusetts**

*Category: Reserve Centers*  
*Mission: Support for Reserve Activities*  
*One-time Cost: \$ 20.7 million*  
*Savings: 1994-99: \$ 19.4 million*  
*Annual: \$ .415 million*  
*Payback: 100+ years*

#### **SECRETARY DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION**

None. The Commission added these military installations to the list of installations recommended for closure or realignment.

#### **COMMUNITY CONCERNS**

All four communities involved expressed support for this consolidation recognizing the economies to be realized by combining command and support structures at an existing base with messing and berthing facilities.

#### **COMMISSION FINDINGS**

The Commission found upon further analysis consolidation of these three Reserve Centers would not deviate substantially from the force structure plan and the final selection criteria. Consolidation of these activities at the existing facilities at Naval Air Station (NAS) South Weymouth, would preserve reserve unit manning levels by keeping a drill site within reasonable commuting distance of the reservists it supports. In addition, consolidation would reduce overhead costs for three separate facilities,

associated messing and berthing costs for assigned reservists, and dispose of three older facilities.

#### **COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION**

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criteria 2 and 3. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Navy and Marine Corps Reserve Center, Lawrence, Massachusetts; close Naval Reserve Center, Chicopee, Massachusetts; and close Naval Reserve Center, Quincy, Massachusetts; and consolidate these activities at existing facilities at NAS South Weymouth, Massachusetts. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

### ***Hospitals***

#### **Naval Hospital Charleston, South Carolina**

*Category: Medical Activity*  
*Mission: Provide Health Care*  
*One-time Cost: N/A*  
*Savings: N/A*  
*Annual: N/A*  
*Payback: N/A*

#### **SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION**

Close the Naval Hospital, Charleston and relocate certain military and civilian personnel to other Naval Hospitals.

#### **SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION**

Naval Hospitals are situated and their size determined for location near operating forces whose personnel will require medical support in numbers significant enough to mandate a medical facility as large as a hospital. Given the extensive use of CHAMPUS, any Naval Hospital closure must be predicated upon the elimination of the operating forces which created a demand for the presence of a Naval Hospital in the first instance. As a result of the closure of the Charleston Naval Station, the Charleston Naval Shipyard and the supporting Supply Center and Public Works Center, the active duty personnel previously supported by the Naval Hospital, Charleston, are no longer in the area to be supported.

Closure of the Naval Hospital follows the closure of these activities supporting these operating forces.

#### **COMMUNITY CONCERNS**

The Charleston community expressed great concern regarding health-care for eligible beneficiaries remaining in the Charleston area if the Charleston Naval Hospital closes. The community argued that if all of the proposed Navy reductions and closures in Charleston were approved by the Commission, there would still be a significant number of active-duty military personnel in the Charleston area requiring medical care. The large number of eligible retirees and dependents would also benefit from the retention of Naval Hospital Charleston. The community argued that should the Naval Hospital, Charleston, close, the eligible retired beneficiary population, including those eligible for Medicare, in the greater Charleston area would be faced with additional and unanticipated medical expenses, particularly in obtaining prescriptions.

#### **COMMISSION FINDINGS**

The Commission found that if the recommended closure of the Charleston Naval Station and Shipyard is approved, the active-duty population supported by the Naval Hospital, Charleston, will be greatly reduced. However, the Commission found that DoD based their recommendation for the closure of the Naval Hospital, Charleston, on changes to mission assignment and not on the requirement to serve the active-duty and eligible beneficiary population found in the Charleston area.

The Commission found that even with the recommended closure of the Naval Station, Charleston and the Naval Shipyard there will still be a substantial number of active duty personnel and eligible beneficiaries in the Charleston area requiring access to health care facilities.

Additionally, the Commission found that Naval Hospital, Charleston, supported eligible beneficiaries from the Myrtle Beach AFB, MCAS Beaufort, Charleston AFB, and elsewhere in the metropolitan Charleston area. In addition, Naval Hospital, Charleston, treats patients who return to the United States on military MEDEVACs flights from Europe.

#### **COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION**

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criteria 1 and criteria 6. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: the Naval Hospital, Charleston, South Carolina, remains open. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force structure plan and final criteria.

#### **Naval Hospital, Oakland, California**

*Category: Medical Activity*

*Mission: Provide Health Care*

*One-time Cost: \$ 57.6 million*

*Savings: 1994-99: \$ 51.6 million*

*Annual: \$ 41.5 million*

*Payback: 3 years*

#### **SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION**

Close the Naval Hospital, Oakland and relocate certain military and civilian personnel to other Naval hospitals, and certain military personnel to the Naval Air Stations at Lemoore and Whidbey Island. The Deployable Medical Unit, Northwest Region, will relocate to Naval Hospital, Bremerton, Washington.

#### **SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION**

Naval Hospitals are situated and their size determined for location near operating forces whose personnel will require medical support in numbers significant enough to mandate a medical facility as large as a hospital. Given the extensive use of CHAMPUS, any Naval Hospital closure must be predicated upon the elimination of the operating forces which created a demand for the presence of a Naval Hospital in the first instance. In the San Francisco Bay area, the Naval Air Station, Alameda, Naval Shipyard, Mare Island and the supporting Public Works Center and Supply Center are being recommended for closure. Given the elimination of these operating force activities, closure of the Naval Hospital, Oakland is indicated as the military personnel previously supported are no longer in the area.

#### **COMMUNITY CONCERNS**

The Oakland community argued plans had been made for the Navy to take over Letterman Army Hospital at the Presidio of San Francisco, and this was a very low-cost way to maintain a needed

Navy facility. The community also argued the Naval Hospital Oakland would be needed to support Navy activities in Alameda as well as other DoD-eligible beneficiaries in the Bay Area. The community expressed great concern regarding health care for the eligible beneficiary population remaining in the Oakland area should the Naval Hospital close. The community also argued they felt a replacement hospital should be built due to the advanced age of the current Navy Hospital at Oakland. The CHAMPUS-eligible beneficiaries were concerned about the possible increase in cost of medical care should they be required to use CHAMPUS or Medicare instead of a DoD medical treatment facility.

#### COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found since the primary military installations in the Bay Area were recommended for closure (with the exception of Naval Supply Center Oakland, a primarily civilian command activity), Naval Hospital Oakland would no longer be required. This finding is in keeping with the DoD policy of providing primary hospital care in support of only active duty populations. The Commission further found the medical needs of retirees could be met at the extensive number of civilian, Veterans' Administration, or military medical facilities within a reasonable distance.

Additionally, the Commission found the current Navy Hospital in Oakland was expensive to operate and maintain due to its advanced age. Investigation by the Commission found that extensive repairs would be essential to bring it up to seismic stabilization standards as well as acceptable medical standards.

#### COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close the Naval Hospital, Oakland and relocate certain military and civilian personnel to other Naval hospitals, and certain military personnel to the Naval Air Stations at Lemoore and Whidbey Island. The Deployable Medical Unit, Northwest Region, will relocate to Naval Hospital, Bremerton, Washington.

#### Naval Hospital, Orlando, Florida

*Category: Medical Activity*  
*Mission: Provide Health Care*  
*One-time Cost: \$ 51.2 million*  
*Savings: 1994-99: \$ -31.0 (Cost)*  
*Annual: \$ 8.1 million*  
*Payback: 13 years*

#### SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close the Naval Hospital, Orlando and relocate certain military and civilian personnel to other Naval Hospitals.

#### SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

Naval hospitals are situated and their size determined for location near operating forces whose personnel will require medical support in numbers significant enough to mandate a medical facility as large as a hospital. Given the extensive use of CHAMPUS, any naval hospital closure must be predicated upon the elimination of the forces which created a demand for the presence of a naval hospital in the first instance. The Naval Training Center, Orlando which was supported by the Naval Hospital, Orlando is being recommended for closure. Accordingly, the operating force support previously provided by the Naval Hospital, Orlando is no longer required and closure follows the decision to close the Naval Training Center.

#### COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The Orlando community expressed great concern over health care for the eligible beneficiaries remaining in the Orlando area should the Naval Hospital close. The Orlando community argued the Naval Hospital, Orlando served approximately 45,000 more patients annually than the Naval Hospital, Great Lakes and operated at a more efficient level. This efficiency resulted in an annual \$8 million saving at Orlando Naval Hospital. The community suggested even with the large number of retirees who receive health care in the Orlando area, the Naval Hospital, Orlando, provided a CHAMPUS savings estimated at \$51 million.

The community also stated the Orlando Naval Hospital was capable of incorporating the additional training requirements with no additional military construction. The Orlando community stressed the Naval Hospital Great Lakes was currently operating at 25% of capacity and would require significant construction if this capacity were to be expanded. The community also argued there was asbestos found throughout the Naval Hospital facility at Great Lakes that would make any expansion both difficult and expensive.

#### COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found the active duty population supported by the Naval Hospital, Orlando, will be greatly reduced with the recommended closure of the Orlando Naval Training Center. The Commission found acceptable the Navy's argument military hospitals are intended to support active-duty personnel and should not be retained in cases when the active-duty population is reduced below levels necessary to warrant a military hospital. In addition, the Commission found it would be less expensive to provide health care to DoD eligible beneficiaries through CHAMPUS than by an active-duty Navy hospital due to the availability of local civilian health care organizations and the competitive atmosphere among health-care providers in the Orlando area. The transfer of Naval Hospital, Orlando, medical personnel to other military installations will increase the availability of medical care at those receiving locations, which in turn will partially offset the predicted increase in CHAMPUS costs in the Orlando area.

#### COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close the Naval Hospital, Orlando and relocate certain military and civilian personnel to other Naval Hospitals.

### **Changes to Previously Approved BRAC 88/91 Recommendations**

#### **Hunters Point Annex to Naval Station Treasure Island, San Francisco, California**

*Category: Naval Shipyard*  
*Mission: Repair, Maintenance,  
and Overhaul of Navy Ships*  
*Cost to Redirect: N/A*  
*Savings: N/A*  
*Annual: N/A*  
*Payback: N/A*

#### **SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION**

Permit the Navy to dispose of this facility in any lawful manner, including outleasing.

#### **SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION**

The 1991 Commission Report, at page 5-18, recommended closing the Hunters Point Annex and outleasing the entire property, with provisions for continued occupancy of space for Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion, and Repair; Planning Engineering for Repair, and Alterations Detachment; and a Contractor-Operated test facility.

Force level reductions consistent with the DoD Force Structure Plan remove any long-term need to retain all of this facility for emergent requirements. The recommended closure of the major naval installations in this geographic area terminates any requirement for these facilities. The limitation of disposal authority to outleasing unnecessarily restricts the Navy's ability to dispose of this property in a timely and lawful manner.

#### **COMMUNITY CONCERNS**

There were no formal expressions from the community.

### COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found the Navy's 1991 request, and the 1991 Commission's subsequent recommendation to outlease Hunters Point Annex unnecessarily inhibits the Navy's ability to dispose of this property.

### COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: permit the Navy to dispose of Hunters Point Annex to Naval Station Treasure Island, California, in any lawful manner, including outleasing.

#### **Marine Corps Air Station Tustin, California**

*Category: Operational Air Station*  
*Mission: Support Naval Aviation Operations*  
*One-time Cost: \$ 897.6 million*  
*Savings: 1994-99: \$ 349.9 million*  
*Annual: \$ 148.5 million*  
*Payback: 4 years*

### SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

None. The Commission added this military installation to the list of installations recommended for closure or realignment. MCAS Tustin was recommended for closure in 1991, with its aviation assets to relocate to MCAGCC Twentynine Palms or Camp Pendleton or both. In 1993 MCAS Tustin's aviation assets were recommended by the Secretary of Defense for redirection to NAS Miramar and MCAS Camp Pendleton.

### COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community did not want the Commission to reconsider its 1991 recommendation to close MCAS Tustin; it wanted the 1991 Commission's closure decision to remain intact. The community had already invested substantially in a base reuse program. It did not want to abandon its two-year investment of effort and money in the reuse plan. The community also believed better alternatives existed to relocate Marine Corps helicopters without retaining MCAS Tustin. Specifically, it proposed: keeping MCAS El Toro open and adding the MCAS Kaneohe Bay fixed

wing mission there; closing NAS Miramar and relocating its units per the Secretary of Defense's recommendations. The community asserted this proposal would enhance operational readiness and still allow the community to pursue its reuse plan. The community also contended the Commission's decision to reconsider its 1991 recommendation would encourage other communities to ignore the finality of the Commission's actions and would encourage communities to resist closures long after the final vote of the Commission.

### COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found a sufficient number of acres were available at NAS Miramar to accommodate the aircraft, personnel, and support equipment from MCAS Tustin in spite of environmental constraints on development. While areas expected to be affected by necessary expansion included critical habitats, none were located in quantities sufficient to preclude anticipated necessary expansion. The Commission also found relocation to NAS Miramar to be operationally advantageous due to close proximity to the Marine division at Camp Pendleton, where a significant percentage of critical training is conducted.

### COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

See Marine Corps Air Station El Toro.

#### **Naval Electronic Systems Engineering Center (NESEC) San Diego, California and NESEC Vallejo, California**

*Category: Naval Technical Center*  
*Mission: Electronic In-Service Engineering*  
*One-time Cost: \$ 914 thousand*  
*Savings: 1994-99: \$ 2.5 million*  
*Annual: \$ 0.65 million*  
*Payback: 3 years*

### SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Change the receiving location of the Naval Electronic Systems Engineering Center (NESEC) San Diego, California and the NESEC Vallejo, California to be Air Force Plant #19 in San Diego vice new construction at Point Loma, San Diego, California.

### SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

This is a change from the 1991 Commission action which called for closure of NESEC San Diego and relocation to Point Loma to form Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center (NCCOSC). Air Force Plant #19 was operated by a contractor as an Air Force Government-Owned-Contractor-Owned and NESEC San Diego subleased space. Now the contractor has left and Air Force offered to transfer Plant 19 without reimbursement. Rehabilitation can be accomplished within the estimates of the BRAC 91 recommendations for both relocating NESECs and avoiding the serious environmental concerns attendant to new construction at Point Loma.

### COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The Vallejo community contended the Navy's estimates to refurbish Air Force Plant #19 are understated. Specifically, the community argued the Navy's military construction estimates do not include the cost of building or refurbishing a remote facility to conduct radiological work, the cost of disassembling and reassembling the extensive computer systems, and the cost of hiring and training employees to replace those who are not willing to relocate. In addition, the community stated the anticipated savings were being extracted from a larger personnel elimination than was advertised by the Navy in 1991. The community provided documentation supporting their claim that cost to execute the DoD redirect would exceed Navy estimates.

### COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found the Navy's cost estimate to refurbish Air Force Plant #19 was reasonable and closely reflected the cost to execute DoD's recommendation. In addition, the Commission found the Navy should realize operation efficiencies through the consolidation of both NESEC San Diego and NESEC Vallejo at AFP #19.

### COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: change the receiving location of the Naval Electronic

Systems Engineering Center (NESEC) San Diego, California, and the NESEC Vallejo, California to be Air Force Plant #19 in San Diego vice new construction at Point Loma, San Diego, California.

### Naval Surface Warfare Center – Pt. Hueneme, Virginia Beach, Virginia (Naval Mine Warfare Engineering Activity, Yorktown, Virginia)

*Category: Technical Center*

*Mission: Support Mine Warfare In-Service  
Engineering*

*One-time Cost: \$7.5 million*

*Savings: 1994-99: \$3.2 million*

*Annual: \$1.1 million*

*Payback: 9 years*

### SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Relocate the Naval Mine Warfare Engineering Activity (now the Naval Surface Warfare Center-Port Hueneme, Yorktown Detachment) to the Naval Surface Warfare Center-Dahlgren, Coastal Systems Station, Panama City, Florida.

### SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

In the 1991 Commission Report, the Naval Mine Warfare Engineering Activity (NMWEA), Yorktown, Virginia, was recommended for closure and realignment to facilities under the control of the Chief of Naval Education and Training at Dam Neck, Virginia. The realignment has been accomplished through organizational changes and NMWEA is now the Yorktown Detachment of the Naval Surface Warfare Center-Port Hueneme. However, after BRAC 91, the needs of the educational and training community were such that the Dam Neck space is no longer available. Therefore, as part of BRAC 93 process, alternative receiving sites were explored. Because of the advisability of consolidating activities performing similar functions, and since the Naval Surface Warfare Center-Dahlgren, Coastal Systems Station, Panama City, Florida, has significant responsibilities in mine warfare R&D, COBRA data was requested. Because of the advantages of collocating this mine warfare engineering activity with another facility having substantial responsibilities in the same fields, and because

it is less expensive than the BRAC 91 relocation to Dam Neck, Virginia, the Navy recommends that the receiving site for this activity be revised to Naval Surface Warfare Center-Dahlgren, Coastal Systems Station, Panama City, Florida, in lieu of Dam Neck, Virginia.

#### **COMMUNITY CONCERNS**

The east coast mine warfare community could be consolidated in the Yorktown, Dam Neck, Little Creek area. The community pointed out the Panama City, Florida, facility consists of many, small buildings instead of the single facility where employees currently work in the Yorktown area. The community also noted there were few mine warfare experts in the Panama City area. The potential loss of these experts could be devastating to the programs, especially in light of the increasing mine warfare role in low-intensity conflict scenarios.

#### **COMMISSION FINDINGS**

The Commission found that space planned for use at Dam Neck by Naval Mine Warfare Engineering Activity was no longer available. The projected potential savings and synergy of collocating like missions in the newly proposed receiver site at Panama City, Florida, outweigh the potential loss of expert personnel.

#### **COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION**

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: relocate the Naval Mine Warfare Engineering Activity (now the Naval Surface Warfare Center-Port Hueneme, Yorktown Detachment) to the Naval Surface Warfare Center-Dahlgren, Coastal Systems Station, Panama City, Florida.

#### **Navy Weapons Evaluation Facility, Albuquerque, New Mexico**

*Category: Technical Center*  
*Mission: Coordinate with Sandia Laboratory,  
Department Of Energy*  
*One-time Cost: N/A*  
*Savings: N/A*  
*Annual: N/A*  
*Payback: N/A*

#### **SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION**

Permit a small detachment of the Weapons Division to remain after the closure of the Naval Weapons Evaluation Facility (NWEF) in order to provide liaison with the Sandia Laboratory of the Department of Energy.

#### **SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION**

This recommendation was originally intended as an exception to the 1991 recommendation to close NWEF Albuquerque, but was not included in the specific DoD recommendations. The Navy has a continuing need for a detachment to provide liaison with the Sandia Laboratory and other agencies involved in nuclear programs in that geographic area. The detachment would remain as a tenant of Kirtland Air Force Base.

#### **COMMUNITY CONCERNS**

There were no formal expressions from the community.

#### **COMMISSION FINDINGS**

The Secretary's recommendation to close Naval Weapons Evaluation Facility, Albuquerque reduces unnecessary infrastructure, however there is a continuing need for a detachment to provide liaison with Sandia Laboratory and other agencies involved in nuclear programs in that geographical area.

#### **COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION**

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: permit a small detachment of the Weapons Division to remain after the closure of the Naval Weapons Evaluation Facility (NWEF), Albuquerque, New Mexico, in order to provide liaison with the Sandia Laboratory of the Department of Energy.

## DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

### *Large Aircraft*

#### **Griffiss Air Force Base, New York**

*Category: Large Aircraft*

*Mission: Bomber/Tanker*

*One-time Cost: \$120.8 million*

*Savings: 1994-99: \$61.8 million*

*Annual: \$39.2 million*

*Payback: 6 years*

#### **SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION**

Griffiss AFB, New York, is recommended for realignment. The 416th Bomb Wing will inactivate. The B-52H aircraft will transfer to Minot AFB, North Dakota, and Barksdale AFB, Louisiana. The KC-135 aircraft from Griffiss AFB will transfer to Grand Forks AFB, North Dakota. The 485th Engineering Installation Group at Griffiss AFB will relocate to Hill AFB, Utah.

The Northeast Air Defense Sector will remain at Griffiss in a cantonment area pending the outcome of a NORAD sector consolidation study. If the sector remains it will be transferred to the Air National Guard (ANG). Rome Laboratory will remain at Griffiss AFB in its existing facilities as a stand-alone Air Force laboratory. A minimum essential airfield will be maintained and operated by a contractor on an "as needed, on call" basis. The ANG will maintain and operate necessary facilities to support mobility/contingency/training of the 10th Infantry (Light) Division located at Fort Drum, New York, and operate them when needed. Only the stand-alone laboratory and the ANG mission will remain.

#### **SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION**

The Air Force has four more large aircraft bases than needed to support the number of bombers, tankers, and airlift assets in the DoD Force Structure Plan. When all eight DoD criteria are applied, Griffiss AFB ranked low compared to the other large aircraft bases. Based on this analysis, the application of all eight DoD selection criteria, and excess capacity which results from reduced force structure, Griffiss AFB is recommended for realignment.

The Air Force plans to establish a large air mobility base in the Northeast to support the new Major Regional Contingency (MRC) strategy. Griffiss AFB was evaluated specifically as the location for this wing, along with other bases that met the geographical criteria and were available for this mission: McGuire AFB, New Jersey and Plattsburgh AFB, New York. Plattsburgh AFB ranked best in capability to support the air mobility wing due to its geographical location, attributes and base loading capacity. Principal mobility attributes include aircraft parking space (for 70-80 tanker/airlift aircraft), fuel hydrants and fuel supply/storage capacity, along with present and future encroachment and airspace considerations.

The Rome Laboratory has a large civilian work force and is located in adequate facilities that can be separated from the rest of Griffiss AFB. It does not need to be closed or realigned as a result of the reductions in the rest of the base.

All large aircraft bases were considered equally in a process that conformed to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-510), as amended, and the Department of Defense (DoD) guidance. Each base was evaluated against the eight DoD selection criteria and a large number of subelements specific to Air Force bases and missions. Extensive data, gathered to support the evaluation of each base under each criterion was reviewed by the Base Closure Executive Group (Executive Group), a group of seven general officers and six Senior Executive Service career civilians appointed by the Secretary of the Air Force. The decision to realign Griffiss AFB was made by the Secretary of the Air Force with advice of the Air Force Chief of Staff and in consultation with the Executive Group.

#### **COMMUNITY CONCERNS**

The Griffiss AFB community believed the Air Force should have selected Griffiss AFB as the East Coast Mobility Base rather than Plattsburgh AFB. The community believed some of the information the Air Force used in selecting the East Coast Mobility Base was erroneous, and if the Air Force knew the facts, it would have selected Griffiss AFB. Community officials addressed parking capacity; petroleum, oils, and