



SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE  
WASHINGTON

November 4, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR BASE CLOSURE EXECUTIVE GROUP CO-CHAIRMEN  
(MR. BOATRIGHT AND MAJ GEN BLUME)

SUBJECT: Base Closure Analysis

I want to take this opportunity to set forth and confirm some general guidelines to be followed as we move forward with the 1995 BRAC process. First, our commitment to the law is, of course, of paramount importance and we must ensure that every step in the BRAC process is in full compliance with all BRAC laws and our implementing Internal Control Plan. Second, it is my firm intention to refine our infrastructure to a level appropriate to support our force structure. We must take advantage of cost saving opportunities and, at the same time, we must maintain our Air Force at an operational level that is fully capable of carrying out its assigned missions throughout the world. I am particularly concerned that we maintain our capability to respond to our wartime commitments. This means that our capacity must include the ability to surge in a time of national crises. To insure these goals are accomplished in the BRAC process, you need to provide me with a variety of options that give me real alternatives from which to assess our infrastructure needs.

I will provide more specific guidance as I review the results of the BCEG analysis in each category, but my overlying principles are as follows:

- a. The BCEG should strive for savings and consider full closures and realignments.
- b. Where it makes both operational sense and achieves cost savings, a cantonment area at a closure base should be considered.
- c. To avoid very large one-time costs associated with some closures and for other purposes, downsizing in place should be considered as an alternative means of reducing excess capacity. Downsizing may be especially appropriate when accomplished in conjunction with closures or realignments.
- d. No reasonable alternatives should be left uncovered in the Joint Cross-Service Group arena. It will be necessary to analyze the impacts on our facilities from potential closures and realignment of other Military Departments.

e. The cost effective realignment of activities should be considered even when such actions cross traditional command, operational or functional lines.

Again, as we proceed through BRAC 1995 we must consider all alternatives that provide the Air Force with the infrastructure to operate in a cost effective manner without operational degradation. This requires innovative analysis unconstrained by artificial imperatives. I look forward to specific discussions as we approach each category.



Sheila E. Widnall